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Safety-of-life Carrier phase Differential Global Navigation Satellite System
(CDGNSS) positioning systems must provide guarantees that their position esti-
mates have errors that are smaller than specified levels, called alert limits (AL).
These guarantees are specified as an allowable probability, called integrity risk
(IR), that the error exceeds its AL. Typical values of IR are between 10−9 and
10−7, per hour of operation. CDGNSS positioning has been demonstrated to pro-
vide centimeter-accurate estimates of a vehicle’s location when the so-called integer
ambiguities are resolved; however, in safety-of-life applications, the probability of
incorrectly resolving the integer ambiguities frequently exceeds the allowable IR.
To address this limitation, existing algorithms bound the positioning error caused
by incorrectly resolved ambiguities. If such bounds satisfy theAL, then the integer-
resolved, or fixed, solution can be used. Unfortunately, the positioning error from
vi
incorrect fixing can exceed several meters, which fails to satisfy the most demand-
ing ALs for autonomous vehicles. This dissertation offers three contributions to the
science of CDGNSS positioning for safety-of-life applications.
First, a novel algorithm is developed that validates the correctness of in-
teger ambiguity estimates. This algorithm, called Generalized Integer Aperture
Bootstrapping (GIAB), establishes a rigorous, fixed-missed-detection-rate test that
provides a guarantee that the integer ambiguities have been fixed correctly. GIAB
also allows for partial fixing, where a subset of the ambiguities are resolved. Partial
fixing allows for graceful degradation of positioning when measurement quality is
poor. GIAB is derived analytically and validated via Monte Carlo simulation. Its
performance is compared with existing ambiguity validation techniques.
Second, the probability density function of the positioning estimate result-
ing from GIAB is derived. This distribution leads to a provable bound on the IR
that the estimate has errors exceeding the specified ALs. This bound allows GIAB
to be used for safety-of-life application while satisfying ALs of less than a meter.
Third, triplex CDGNSS architectures, in which the vehicle position is esti-
mated using three separate navigation systems with mid-level voting (MLV) logic,
are analyzed. Such architectures are commonly used since they are robust to sin-
gle equipment failures, but the integrity benefit of their fault-free performance has
not previously been evaluated. It is shown that integer-fixed CDGNSS solutions
improve in accuracy performance, but gain no integrity benefit. However, when
the integer constraint is not enforced, the so called CDGNSS float solution benefits
greatly from MLV in both accuracy and integrity performance.
vii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Carrier Phase Differential Global Navigation Satellite Sys-
tem Positioning
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receivers produce two funda-
mental types of measurement. The first, called pseudorange, is a noisy, biased
estimate of the total distance between the satellite’s antenna and the receiver’s an-
tenna. Sources of pseudorange error include atmospheric delay, multipath interfer-
ence from reflected signals, thermal noise in the electronics, receiver clock errors,
and errors in the broadcast satellite orbit and clock models. Even when corrected
using data from the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS), these errors exceed
2 meters in standard deviation [24, 38].
The second type of measurement, called carrier phase, is a less noisy, though
still biased measurement of the change in range between the satellite and the re-
ceiver antennas from the time that carrier phase lock was established until the time
of the measurement. Many of the error sources that afflict pseudoranges also im-
pact carrier phases, including atmospheric delays and broadcast model errors, but
these common errors are mitigated via double-difference processing, as described
in Appendix A. Whereas the uncorrected differential pseudorange errors are sev-
eral meters in magnitude, the corresponding carrier phase errors are smaller than
1
a centimeter. The challenge for CDGNSS is that carrier phase only measures the
change in range, and so is ambiguous with respect to the full range to the satellite.
Fortunately, this ambiguity is an integer multiple of the wavelength of the GNSS
carrier signal.
The process of estimating the integer ambiguities is called integer ambiguity
ambiguity resolution or integer fixing. Two of the most common methods for inte-
ger fixing are Integer Bootstrapping (IB) [30] and Integer Least Squares (ILS) [32].
The probability that an integer estimator correctly resolves the ambiguities is called
the probability of correct fix, or PCF . ILS is an optimal estimator in that it has the
maximum PCF of all permissible integer estimators. The ILS probability of cor-
rect fix, PCF ,ILS has no analytical formula, but its tightest lower bound is the IB
probability of correct fix, PCF ,IB ≤ PCF ,ILS.
Prior to estimating the ambiguities as integers, they are estimated jointly
with the relative position, or baseline, b, between two GNSS antennas as real-valued
approximations. This joint estimate is called the float solution comprising the float
baseline, bˆ, and the float ambiguity, aˆ, alluding to the floating-point representation
of real-valued numbers in computers. The float solution is derived in Appendix B.
Once the fixed ambiguities, aˇ, are estimated, the float baseline is corrected
based on the residual between the float and fixed ambiguities. The resulting baseline
estimate is called the fixed baseline, denoted bˇ. If the fixed ambiguities are correct,
then the fixed baseline is an unbiased estimate of the true baseline, b; however,
if the fixed ambiguities are incorrect, then the fixed baseline can have a bias that
is excessively large, often exceeding the float baseline error. This dissertation is
2
concerned primarily with methods to validate the correctness of the fixed ambiguity
estimate and to bound the position-domain errors in the baseline solution in the
event that the fixed ambiguities cannot be fully validated.
1.2 Required Navigation Performance
Safety-of-life navigation systems are specified using the concepts of Re-
quired Navigation Performance (RNP). RNP is assessed in terms of integrity, ac-
curacy, continuity, and availability [6]. Integrity is specified in terms of integrity
risk (IR), the probability that the solution error exceeds an alert limit (AL) without
warning. Accuracy can be specified in terms of quantiles of interest, such as 95%
accuracy, which refers to the error volume within which 95% of solutions fall. Con-
tinuity risk (CR) is the probability that the solution will become unavailable during
a critical exposure interval given that it was available at the beginning of that in-
terval. Availability is the percentage of time that the solution satisfies its required
integrity, accuracy, and continuity requirements.
RNP for CDGNSS systems has become more demanding with each new
application. The ground-based augmentation system (GBAS), originally specified
over a decade ago as a landing aid for large runways on land, required ALs of 10
m with IR on the order of 10−7 per approach. This leads to a relatively loose 95%
accuracy requirement of 2 m for a zero-mean-error Gaussian-distributed solution,
which can be met by a float CDGNSS solution. More recent navigation system
applications, such as landing aboard an aircraft carrier or a recent demonstration
of autonomous aerial refueling [1], have meter-level ALs, IR on the order of 10−7,
3
and decimeter-level accuracy requirements.
The next generation of safety-of-life CDGNSS use cases includes fully au-
tonomous landing and refueling of large, unmanned aerial vehicles, and automated
land vehicle navigation. These applications will demand centimeter- to decimeter-
level position accuracy and more stringent solution integrity than all previous ap-
plications. Integrity is specified in terms of integrity risk (IR), the probability that
the solution error exceeds an alert limit (AL) without warning. The percentage of
time that a system meets its required navigation performance, including accuracy
and IR, is called solution availability. For safety-of-life applications, IR is between
of 10−9 and 10−7 per hour, with required availability in excess of 99%.
1.3 CDGNSS and RNP
The ILS probability of incorrect fix, or failure, is denoted PF,ILS = 1 −
PCF ,ILS. It is common for PF,ILS to be orders of magnitude greater than IR. PF,ILS is
a function of the measurement quality, satellite geometry, and number of measure-
ments used. Typically, 0.001 < PF,ILS < .1 for most CDGNSS applications [3,16].
Because IR  PF,ILS frequently, safety-of-life systems have not historically used
fixed solutions. To exploit the accuracy benefit of the fixed solution while pro-
tecting solution integrity, the biases induced by any incorrect fixes must be ad-
dressed. Two such methods are the Geometry Extra Redundant Almost Fixed So-
lutions (GERAFS) [42] and the Enforced Position-domain Integrity-risk of Cycle
resolution (EPIC) [17, 18] algorithms.
In both EPIC and GERAFS, the IB algorithm is used to fix the integer ambi-
4
guities because there are analytic expressions for PCF ,IB as well as the probabilities
that IB will incorrectly resolve the ambiguities to any particular integer offset from
the true ambiguity [29]. Denote the IB fixed baseline and fixed ambiguities as
bˇIB ∈ R3 and aˇIB ∈ Zm, respectively. Each potential integer offset between the
true and IB ambiguity, ∆aˇk ∈ Zm would result in a particular bias in the baseline
estimate, µk.
The total probability that the fixed baseline estimate has errors that exceed
the AL in vertical or horizontal dimensions can then be computed by considering
the alternative hypotheses that the true ambiguity is a = aˇIB −∆aˇk. Let b and bˇIB
denote the vertical components of b and bˇIB, respectively. Similarly, VAL is the AL
in the vertical direction. The IR for the IB solution is
P
(∣∣bˇIB − b∣∣ > VAL) = ∑
∆aˇk∈Zm
P
(∣∣bˇIB − b∣∣ > VAL∣∣ aˇIB = a+ ∆aˇk) (1.1)
GERAFS and EPIC both bound this probability and issue an alert whenever the
bound exceeds a specified IR. A similar computation must be made for both the
vertical and horizontal components of the baseline estimate. Both GERAFS and
EPIC use measurement models to decide a priori whether to use the fixed or float
baseline estimate. Such methods called “model-driven.”
Alternatively, data-driven methods use a posteriori statistical tests on the
ambiguity residual , denoted ˇ = aˆ − aˇ, to choose between the float and fixed
baseline estimates. Such methods aim to reduce the probability of accepting an
incorrect fix by rejecting fixes with ambiguity residuals that are large in a statistical
sense. One class of data-driven methods is Integer Aperture (IA) estimators [28].
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Many such methods have been proposed including the ratio test [37], the difference
test [43], the projector test [39], integer aperture bootstrapping [33], ellipsoidal IA
[31], and the optimal IA estimator [36]. When extended to include partial ambiguity
resolution, IA estimators are called Generalized Integer Aperture (GIA) estimators
[4].
Existing IA methods are insufficient for safety-of-life applications, as will
be discussed in Ch. 2, but they are attractive because they validate the correctness
of the integer ambiguity estimate, eliminating the need to account for the position-
domain biases by incorrect fixes. If an IA method could be devised such that PF
can be proven to be less than a specified failure rate, P¯F < IR, then such a sys-
tem could satisfy smaller ALs since the IA method would preclude large biases in
the baseline estimate. This dissertation develops such a GIA method and demon-
strates its performance. An important result of this work is that GIA methods imply
position-domain biases when the full set of ambiguities is unable to be validated.
The concept of position-domain integrity from the model-driven EPIC algorithm is
extended to the novel data-driven method developed in this dissertation.
1.4 Triplex CDGNSS Architectures
A common design approach in safety-of-life systems to improve continuity
performance is to have three subsystems that perform the same function. Such
designs are called triplex architectures. Such architectures provide continuity of
the required function with a redundant backup even when a single subsystem fails.
The outputs of the three systems can be combined using mid-level voting (MLV),
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in which the middle value of each output from the subsystems is selected for use by
other parts of the overall system.
MLV-triplex architecture provide the additional benefit that latent faults –
faults present in the system, but not yet detected or excluded – will not corrupt the
final output from the MLV logic. This benefit reduces integrity risk since a latent
fault in a simplex (non-redundant) architecture can cause a large positioning error.
Even in a triplex architecture that averages the three solutions, a single large error
can cause the final estimate to have an error that exceeds an AL without an alarm.
Because the integrity requirements of current and future CDGNSS positioning sys-
tems are so demanding, it is worth considering the potential benefits of MLV-triplex
architectures on fault-free integrity performance.
1.5 Thesis Statement and Expected Contributions
This dissertation defends the following thesis statement:
Integer-fixed CDGNSS positioning for demanding safety-of-life applica-
tions requires a novel data-driven integer ambiguity validation method which ben-
efits further from mid-level voting triplex architectures.
The following is a summary of the contributions of this dissertation:
1. Generalized Integer Aperture Bootstrapping: The Generalized Integer
Aperture Bootstrapping (GIAB) algorithm is developed to provide provable
guarantees that the fixed integer ambiguities are correct with a known proba-
bility of failure. The performance of GIAB is compared to existing IA meth-
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ods, and the theoretical performance of the algorithm is validated via Monte
Carlo simulation. This work has been published in [11, 15].
2. Data-Driven Position-Domain Integrity for Generalized Integer Aper-
ture Bootstrapping: The several important conditional probability density
functions are derived for the baseline estimate produced by the GIAB al-
gorithm. We prove that baseline estimates produced from data-driven par-
tial ambiguity resolution methods have biased a posteriori error distributions
even when the baseline estimate is only constrained based on correctly val-
idated ambiguities. The a posteriori distribution of the GIAB baseline es-
timate is used to derive a data-driven position-domain integrity approach,
ensuring that GIAB is fully appropriate for safety-of-life applications. The
theoretical distributions derived in this paper are validated via Monte Carlo
simulation. The performance of GIAB is compared to the EPIC. This work
has been published in [12, 15].
3. Correlation-Aware Integrity Protection for Fault-Free MLV-Triplex
CDGNSS Solutions: Integrity risk monitors are derived for MLV-triplex
CDGNSS architectures using float, fixed, or position- domain integrity so-
lutions. The performance of all monitors is compared using a world-wide
covariance analysis tool, called the availability model (AM). Improvements
for each type of CDGNSS solution are shown by comparison to simplex ver-
sions of the same algorithms. This work has been published in [10, 13, 14].
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1.6 Published Works
The publications to which the author contributed during the course of car-
rying out the contributions described in this dissertation are as follows:
Journal Publications
1. G. Nathan Green and Todd E. Humphreys. Data-driven generalized integer
aperture bootstrapping for high-integrity positioning. IEEE Transactions on
Aerospace and Electronic Systems, 2017. Submitted for review.
2. G. Nathan Green and Todd E. Humphreys. Position-domain integrity anal-
ysis for generalized integer aperture bootstrapping. IEEE Transactions on
Aerospace and Electronic Systems, 2017. Submitted for review.
3. G. Nathan Green and Todd E. Humphreys. Correlation-aware integrity pro-
tection for fault-free federated triplex CDGNSS solutions. Navigation, Jour-
nal of the Institute of Navigation, 2018. In preparation.
Conference Publications
1. G. Nathan Green, Martin King, and Todd E. Humphreys. Fault free integrity
of mid-level voting for triplex differential GPS solutions. In Proceedings of
the ION GNSS+ Meeting, Tampa, FL, 2015.
2. G. Nathan Green, Martin King, and Todd E. Humphreys. Data-driven gener-
alized integer aperture bootstrapping for real-time high integrity applications.
In Proceedings of the IEEE/ION PLANS Meeting, Savannah, GA, 2016.
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3. G. Nathan Green and Todd E. Humphreys. World-wide triplex CDGNSS
performance. In ”The Proceedings of the Royal Institute of Navigation”,
Glasgow, Scotland, UK, 2016.
1.6.1 Dissertation Organization
Chapter 2 develops the GIAB algorithm, including a method to establish
the acceptance thresholds to rigorously control PF while nearly maximizing PCF .
Chapter 3 derives important conditional probability density functions of the GIAB-
produced baseline estimate, validates the correctness of the distributions via Monte
Carlo simulation, extends model-driven position-domain integrity concepts to data-
driven position-domain integrity, and demonstrates the performance improvement
of GIAB over the existing state-of-the-art algorithm, EPIC. Chapter 4 develops
MLV-triplex CDGNSS integrity risk monitors and compares their performance via
the AM tool. Chapter 5 concludes this dissertation with a summary of the contribu-
tions.
Some of the longer derivations of important results from the contributions
are collected in appendices. Appendix A provides a detailed derivation of a GNSS
measurement model. Appendix B derives the linearized least-squares estimator
called the float solution. Appendix C explores important properties of the float
ambiguity error and the IB algorithm. Appendix D derives a method to efficiently
search all non-negligible integer ambiguity alternatives while providing a provable
bound on the integrity risk taken by neglecting unexplored alternatives. Appendix E
derives an integrity monitor for MLV-triplex solutions when the correlations among
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the three solutions are unknown.
1.7 Nomenclature
AL Alert Limit
AM Availability Model
BIE Best Integer Equivariant
BRSD Between Receiver Single Difference
CCD Code Carrier Divergence
CDF Cumulative Density Function
CF Correct Fix
CR Continuity Risk
CSC Carrier Smoothed Code
DFS Divergence Free Smoothing
EPIC Enforced Position-domain Integrity-risk of Cycle resolution
EPIR Enlarged Pull-In Region
GBAS Ground Based Augmentation System
GERAFS Geometry Extra Redundant Almost Fixed Solutions
GIA Generalized Integer Aperture
GIAB Generalized Integer Aperture Bootstrapping
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GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System
IA Integer Aperture
IAB Integer Aperture Bootstrapping
IB Integer Bootstrapping
ILS Integer Least Squares
IR Integrity Risk
LPF Low Pass Filter
MAP Maximum A Posteriori
ML Maximum Likelihood
MLV Mid-Level Voting
MMSE Miminum Mean Square Error
PAR Partial Ambiguity Resolution
PDF Probability Density Function
RF Radio Frequency
RNP Required Navigation Performance
SV Space Vehicle
WAAS Wide Area AugmentationSystem
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Chapter 2
Generalized Integer Aperture Bootstrapping
2.1 Introduction
This chapter 1 focuses on the portion of the IR budget allocated to incor-
rect resolution, or fixing, of the carrier-phase integer ambiguities that are a central
feature of CDGNSS positioning. This portion is specified as the acceptable proba-
bility of incorrect fix, or failure rate, P¯F . High-integrity CDGNSS techniques must
provably satisfy demandingly low P¯F . Two such methods are the Geometry Ex-
tra Redundant Almost Fixed Solutions (GERAFS) [42] and the Enforced Position-
domain Integrity-risk of Cycle resolution (EPIC) [17,18] algorithms. Both of these
rely exclusively on a priori error models to determine, before the measurements are
processed, whether a fixed solution or a float backup solution will be selected. This
approach is termed model-driven because the solution selection logic is entirely
dependent on the prior error model. Because the EPIC and GERAFS algorithms at-
tempt to bound IR using the a priori distribution, they are inherently conservative.
1This chapter was based on
1. G. Nathan Green and Todd E. Humphreys. Data-driven generalized integer aperture boot-
strapping for high-integrity positioning. IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic
Systems, 2017. Submitted for review.
The author contributed all derivation, simulation, and analysis in that paper and in this chapter.
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Their conservatism arises from the need to protect against potentially-incorrect fixes
without the benefit of conditioning on the observed carrier phase measurements.
In contrast to the model-driven approach, data-driven methods decide a pos-
teriori whether to accept the fixed or float solution. Conditioning the selection on
the observed measurements can reduce the risk of incorrect fixing. A subset of
data-driven methods is called integer aperture (IA) estimation. In IA methods, the
integer ambiguity vector is estimated using either integer bootstrapping (IB) [26]
or integer least squares (ILS) [34], after which a test statistic is computed from
the ambiguity residual, i.e., the difference between the float and fixed ambiguities.
This test statistic is compared to a threshold to decide between the fixed and float
solution.
Perhaps the simplest IA method is IA bootstrapping (IAB), which resolves
the integer ambiguities via IB and then tests the fixed solution by applying IB to a
scaled-up version of the ambiguity residual [33]. If the test returns the zero vector,
which occurs only when the residual is small, then the fixed solution is selected;
otherwise the float solution is selected. IAB is sub-optimal in the sense that IB
does not always find the maximum likelihood integer ambiguity, as opposed to ILS,
which is guaranteed to do so. It is also sub-optimal in the sense that it does not max-
imize the probability of successfully fixing the ambiguities for a given probability
of incorrectly fixing them. But it has the advantage that all of these probabilities
have analytically computable values, which allows the decision threshold to be set
analytically as a function of P¯F . More generally, IAB enables the strict performance
requirements that safety-of-life applications demand to be provably satisfied.
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The remaining IA methods discussed in this section solve for the integer
ambiguity with ILS, which is optimal in the maximum likelihood sense for Gaus-
sian measurement noise. Ellipsoidal IA takes the covariance weighted norm of the
ILS ambiguity residual as its test statistic [31]. As with IAB, the simplicity of this
statistic allows the decision threshold to be set analytically, but the probability of
successfully fixing the ambiguities is sub-optimal. While ellipsoidal IA can have
a higher probability of success than IAB for models with a few ambiguities of ap-
proximately equal conditional variance, IAB tends to provide a higher probability
of success for models in which the conditional variances of the ambiguities differ by
more than about 10%, which tends to be the case for realistic measurement models.
Other ILS-based IA methods employ test statistics that are a function of the
ambiguity residuals of the ILS fix and of one or more higher-cost alternate fixes.
These include the ratio test [37], the difference test [43], and the optimal test [36].
Unlike IAB and ellipsoidal IA, none of these methods’ test statistics has an analyt-
ical probability distribution or decision threshold [35]. In practice, decision thresh-
olds are set based on one of a few ad hoc methods. The crudest of these, which
applies a fixed threshold for all measurement models, does not allow one to control
the actual probability of incorrect fix, PF , for time-varying measurement models.
More sophisticated methods determine the decision threshold that approximately
satisfies P¯F via Monte Carlo simulation, lookup tables [37], or functional approx-
imations [3, 40]. But these techniques are inapt for safety-of-life systems because
the resulting thresholds cannot be analytically proven to satisfy P¯F for any particu-
lar model. At best, they incorporate sufficient conservatism to protect the solution
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at the expense of decreased availability. Of course, in the limit as the number of test
points becomes exceedingly large, Monte Carlo simulation for a given measure-
ment model can yield an arbitrarily exact decision threshold, but such simulation is
hardly feasible for real-time operation.
The optimal IA algorithm takes as its test statistic the a posteriori probabil-
ity of correct fix [27]. Counterintuitively, the threshold corresponding to a particular
P¯F for this statistic is not analytically computable. Also, the optimal IA estimator
involves an infinite sum over all possible integer ambiguities. The search can be
truncated once a sufficiently large number of integer fixes has been evaluated, but
the number required depends on the strength of the model and on the required P¯F .
To satisfy the most demanding integrity requirements, the search often extends to
several hundred candidate fixes in realistic scenarios, which becomes impractical
for real-time applications.
This chapter’s focus on IAB is motivated by the alternative IA approaches’
computational complexity or lack of an analytical connection between P¯F and the
decision threshold.
This chapter extends the IAB technique to a generalized form in which sub-
sets of the full set of integer ambiguities are considered for resolution if the full
set cannot be resolved confidently. This generalization makes IAB a member of
the family of Generalized Integer Aperture (GIA) estimators [4]. These algorithms
evaluate successively smaller subsets until either a satisfactory fix is found or the
float solution is applied as a last resort. Also known as partial ambiguity resolution
(PAR), this technique ensures gradual degradation of performance for weak models.
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In summary, to meet the increasingly stringent performance requirements
of safety-of-life applications there is a need for a data-driven ambiguity resolution
and validation method whose decision threshold for choosing between a fixed and
float solution can be set analytically for a desired P¯F . To maximize availability,
the method must be generalized to accommodate PAR. Extant methods in the high-
integrity CDGNSS literature do not satisfy this need.
This chapter offers three contributions to address this need. First, IAB is
extended to encompass PAR. The extended technique is called Generalized Integer
Aperture Bootstrapping (GIAB). Second, analytical characterizations of the prob-
ability of incorrect fix, correct partial fix, and correct full fix are developed and
validated. Third, a method for setting the integer aperture size and shape is devel-
oped that ensures GIAB’s availability exceeds IAB’s subject to a given P¯F . These
contributions are validated with a set of Monte Carlo simulations, and algorithm
performance is compared to the optimal IA, ellipsoidal IA, and IAB methods.
2.2 Generalized Integer Aperture Bootstrapping
2.2.1 Integer Bootstrapping Overview
The basic theory of IB is reproduced here from [26] with a few amplifica-
tions for ease of understanding and notational consistency. The treatment begins
with the linearized, short-baseline GNSS measurement model
y = Bb+ Aa+ ν (2.1)
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where y ∈ Rn contains the “observed-minus-modeled” double-difference carrier-
phase and, optionally, pseudorange measurements, b ∈ R3 is the unknown, real-
valued correction to the modeled baseline between GNSS antennas, a ∈ Zm holds
the unknown carrier phase integer ambiguities, B and A are appropriately dimen-
sioned measurement sensitivity matrices, and ν ∈ Rn is the zero-mean, double-
difference measurement noise with variance Qy. See Appendix B for a derivation
of this measurement equation and Appendix A for a derivation of an appropriate
model for Qy.
Applying weighted least squares estimation to (2.1), with H = [B A], pro-
duces real-valued estimates of b and a:bˆ
aˆ
 = (HTQ−1y H)−1HTQ−1y y (2.2a)
E

bˆ
aˆ

 =
b
a
 (2.2b)
cov

bˆ
aˆ

 =
Qbˆ Qbˆaˆ
QT
bˆaˆ
Qaˆ
 = (HTQ−1y H)−1 (2.2c)
The estimates aˆ ∈ Rm and bˆ ∈ R3, called the float ambiguity and float baseline,
ignore the integer constraint a ∈ Zm.
Integer ambiguity resolution techniques map the float ambiguity aˆ to a vec-
tor of integers aˇ ∈ Zm. Such processes can be represented by the map
aˇ = M(aˆ, Qaˆ) : Rm × Sm++ 7→ Zm (2.3)
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where Sm++ is the set of positive definite matrices of size m × m. The IB variant
of M operates in such a way that when Qaˆ has non-zero off-diagonal elements, the
probability that aˇ = a depends on the ordering of the elements of aˆ [26]. To ensure
near-optimal IB performance, an integer-preserving transformation is applied to
decorrelate, insofar as possible, the elements of aˆ; details of this transformation,
referred to as the Z-transform, may be found in [25, 32]. The decorrelated float
ambiguity is zˆ = ZT aˆ, and the transformed true ambiguity is z = ZTa, with
Z being the integer-preserving transformation matrix. Likewise, Qaˆ and Qbˆaˆ are
transformed as Qzˆ = ZTQaˆZ and Qbˆ zˆ = QbˆaˆZ. All integer-related operations
hereafter will be performed in the decorrelated space, with zˆ referred to as the float
ambiguity.
The functional map M(zˆ, Qzˆ) partitions Rm into disjoint subsets, called
pull-in regions, that collectively cover Rm. Each region is an integer-valued trans-
lation of the subset
S0 , {zˆ |M(zˆ, Qzˆ) = 0} (2.4)
The pull-in region Sζ ⊂ Rm is the set of all zˆ mapped by M(zˆ, Qzˆ) to the integer
vector ζ ∈ Zm:
Sζ , {zˆ |M(zˆ, Qzˆ) = ζ, ζ ∈ Zm} = S0 + ζ (2.5)
For IB, the pull-in regions are m-dimensional parallelotopes centered on the inte-
gers.
For presentation of the IB algorithm, it will be convenient to decompose the
covariance of the float ambiguity asQzˆ = LDLT , where L is a unit lower triangular
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matrix and D is a diagonal matrix, and to model the float ambiguity as the true
ambiguity plus zero-mean Gaussian noise, zˆ = z+,  ∼ N(0, Qzˆ). Multiplication
by L−1 transforms  into a vector whose elements are mutually uncorrelated: c ,
L−1, c ∼ N(0, D). Letting lij denote the ijth element of L, di the ith element of
the diagonal of D, and i and ci the ith elements of  and c, respectively, i and its
variance can be computed from the first i components of c as
i =
i∑
k=1
likck, var (i) =
i∑
k=1
l2ikdk (2.6)
IB can be interpreted as greedy constrained maximum likelihood estimation
in which the integer constraint z ∈ Zm is applied sequentially. Application of the
integer constraint can also be viewed as conditioning on an assumed value of .
For convenience in what follows, let the shorthand notation vI denote the vector
composed of the first i−1 elements of any vector v of sufficient length. Thus, I =
[1, . . . , i−1]
T . Let j|I represent the jth element of  conditioned on I being
known. Starting with (2.6), and exploiting the lack of correlation in the elements of
c, it is shown in Section C.1 that
j|I ∼ N
(
i−1∑
k=1
ljkck,
j∑
k=i
l2jkdk
)
, j = i, ...,m (2.7)
Note that var(i|I) = di. Thus, di can be interpreted as the conditional variance
of the ith ambiguity. A larger value of di indicates that correct integer resolution of
the ith ambiguity will be more difficult.
One may alternatively find the mean of j|I via the standard expression for
conditional mean. Assume I ∼ N(0, QI), and let QjI ∈ R1×(i−1) be the cross-
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correlation matrix between j and I , for j ≥ i. Then the mean of j conditioned
on knowledge of I is [2]
E[j|I ] = QjIQ−1I I (2.8)
With these preliminaries, the algorithm for a single step of IB is straightfor-
ward. Let zI = [z1, . . . , zi−1]
T , and suppose that one assumes zI = zˇI for some
known zˇI = [zˇ1, . . . , zˇi−1]
T ∈ Zi−1. Then, starting from zˆ = z+, the constrained
maximum likelihood estimate of zi given zI = zˇI is
zˆi|I = zˆi −QiIQ−1I (zˆI − zˇI) (2.9)
Defining ˇ , zˆ− zˇ and ˇc , L−1ˇ, and referencing (2.7) and (2.8), one recognizes
(2.9) as equivalent to
zˆi|I = zˆi − E [i| I = ˇI ]
= zˆi −
i−1∑
k=1
lik ˇck
= zi +
i∑
k=1
likck −
i−1∑
k=1
lik ˇck
(2.10)
where the last equality makes use of zˆi = zi + i and (2.6). The quantities zˆi|I , i =
1, 2, ...,m are called the sequentially-constrained float ambiguity estimates; these
are stacked to form the vector zˆc.
It is shown in Appendix C.2 that ˇc = zˆc−zˇ, which evokes an interpretation
of ˇc as the sequentially-constrained ambiguity residual. When ˇci, the ith element
of ˇc, is small, this implies that the sequentially-constrained float estimate zˆci = zˆi|I
is close to zˇi, meaning the assumption zi = zˇi is likely correct. If the assumption is
21
correct for all zk, k ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1}, then ck = ˇck for all k ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1}, and
(2.10) simplifies to
zˆi|I = zi + ci (2.11)
The appearance of ci as the sole noise element in this equation indicates that, given
the true value of zI , zˆi|I is uncorrelated with I , and, by extension, with zˆI . This
important property allows the integer constraint zi ∈ Z to be enforced directly
on zˆi|I by simple rounding, yielding the sequentially-maximum-likelihood integer
estimate
zˇi = bzˆi|Ie (2.12)
where b·e denotes nearest integer rounding. The set of successively-obtained in-
teger estimates are stacked to form the vector zˇ = [zˇ1, . . . , zˇm]
T , which is called
the fixed ambiguity, as distinguished from the float ambiguity zˆ. Note that zˇ is not
necessarily the maximum-likelihood (ML) estimate; rather it is a greedy approxi-
mation to the ML estimate. Note also that if one or more of the elements in zI are
constrained incorrectly, i.e. the integer error vector ∆zI , zˇI −zI is nonzero, then
(2.10) instead becomes
zˆi|I = zi + ci +
i−1∑
k=1
lik∆zk (2.13)
where ∆zk is the kth element of ∆zI .
To summarize, the ith IB iteration starts by assuming zI = zˇI , calculates
zˆi|I subject to this constraint as in the center equation in (2.10), then rounds zˆi|I to
the nearest integer to obtain zˇi. The full IB algorithm becomes clear by mention
22
of two additional points: (1) zˇI is taken to be composed of the integer-rounded
estimates from previous steps, and (2) for i = 1, zˆi|I = zˆi.
An efficient implementation of IB is given in pseudocode below. This im-
plementation, which is functionally equivalent to that given in [26] although its
internal details differ, is the starting point for the new algorithm developed in this
chapter.
Algorithm 2.1: IB(zˆ, L)
Input : zˆ ∈ Rm, L ∈ Rm×m
Output: zˇ ∈ Zm
1 zˆc = zˆ
2 for i = 1:m do
3 zˇi = bzˆcie
4 ˇci = zˆci − zˇi
5 for j = i+1:m do
6 zˆcj = zˆcj − lij ˇci
7 end
8 end
Once the fixed ambiguity zˇ is computed, an integer-constrained baseline
estimate, called the fixed baseline, is produced as
bˇ = bˆ−Qbˆ zˆQ−1zˆ ˇ
= bˆ−Qbˆ zˆL−TD−1ˇc
(2.14)
The corresponding covariance matrix reflects the improved precision of the baseline
estimate due to integer fixing, assuming all ambiguities were fixed correctly:
Qbˇ = Qbˆ −Qbˆ zˆQ−1zˆ QTbˆ zˆ (2.15)
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The distribution of the fully-fixed baseline conditioned on a particular fixed ambi-
guity zˇ = z + ∆z is [32]
(
bˇ |zˇ = z + ∆z ) ∼ N (b+Qbˆ zˆQ−1zˆ ∆z, Qbˇ) (2.16)
Thus, when the integer ambiguity is fixed correctly (∆z = 0), the fully-fixed base-
line has a Gaussian distribution whose mean equals the true baseline b.
2.2.2 Integer Aperture Bootstrapping (IAB)
IAB extends the IB concept by adding a validation test [33]. The test statistic
for IAB can be expressed as a function of the ambiguity residual ˇ , zˆ − zˇ and a
parameter β ∈ [0, 1] called the aperture parameter:
T (ˇ, L, β) =
∥∥∥∥IB( 1β ˇ, L
)∥∥∥∥
0
(2.17)
Here, ‖v‖0 , |{i | vi 6= 0}| denotes the number of non-zero elements in the vector
v. It can be shown that T (ˇ, L, β) = 0 ⇐⇒ |ˇci| < β2 , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} [33].
Thus, a small β ensures that T (ˇ, L, β) = 0 only when the sequentially-constrained
ambiguity residuals are small, implying that zˇ = z with high probability. Accord-
ingly, IAB accepts the integer fix produced by IB whenever T = 0, but otherwise
rejects it. In the event that the fix is rejected, IAB resorts to the float solution zˆ.
The overall IAB process can be represented by the map
IAB (zˆ, L, β) ,

IB(zˆ, L) if T (ˇ, L, β) = 0
zˆ otherwise
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Note that, since IB(ˇ, L) = 0, a fixed solution can be forced by choosing β = 1;
likewise, a float solution is forced by β = 0.
The set of all float ambiguities mapped to the vector ζ, called Ωζ , is a subset
of the corresponding pull-in region of IB(zˆ, L), with equality if and only if β = 1:
Ωζ = {zˆ | IAB (zˆ, L, β) = ζ } ⊆ Sζ (2.18)
Such sets are called apertures. Due to the integer invariance of IB, Ωζ = Ω0 + ζ.
The IAB apertures have the same shape as the IB pull-in region but are
scaled by a factor of β. Accordingly, gaps between integer-shifted apertures emerge
whenever β < 1, as illustrated in Fig. 2.1. Three important regions can be identi-
fied in Fig. 2.1, each corresponding to a possible IAB outcome. The central, dark
region corresponds to the success event in which the full ambiguity set is resolved
correctly. The union of the many lightly shaded regions corresponds to the fail-
ure event in which one or more integer ambiguities are fixed incorrectly. Values of
 = zˆ − z falling in the unshaded region result in the fix being rejected. This is the
undecided event. The probabilities of these events are [33]
PS =
m∏
i=1
(
2Φ
(
β/2√
di
)
− 1
)
(2.19a)
PF =
∑
z˜∈Zm\{0}
m∏
i=1
(
Φ
(
β
2
− Liz˜√
di
)
− Φ
(
−β
2
− Liz˜√
di
))
(2.19b)
PU = 1− PF − PS (2.19c)
where Li is the ith row of L−1, and Φ (·) is the CDF of the standard normal random
variable.
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Figure 2.1: IAB aperture regions for a two-dimensional example model. This is a
visual representation of the possible outcomes of IAB(zˆ − z, L, β). The central,
darkly shaded region is the success region, in which zˇ = z. The lightly shaded
regions correspond to incorrect ambiguity fixes, in which zˇ 6= z. The unshaded
region is the fix-rejection region.
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A few observations should be made about the event probabilities. First,
calculation of PF involves an infinite sum over all integer ambiguities other than
the correct one. One can calculate an approximate PF by summing over a large
number of alternative ambiguities, but this may still be computationally expensive
if the specified acceptable PF , written P¯F , is small or if m is large. Second, PF is
a monotonically increasing function of β, which implies that PF decreases as the
integer aperture is made smaller. Thus, the aperture parameter β controls the failure
probability. Third, PS is also monotonically increasing in β, which implies that any
increase in PS comes at the expense of an increase in PF .
2.2.3 Generalization to Partial Ambiguity Resolution
Accepting or rejecting the whole of zˇ, as IAB does, is an extreme approach
that limits the range of useful outcomes. Consider instead a variant of IAB in which
a subset of the elements of zˇ may be accepted. IAB is well suited to such gen-
eralization from full to partial ambiguity resolution, for two reasons. First, the
lack of correlation between the elements of ˇc allows an aperture test to be ap-
plied separately to each element. Moreover, the test can be tailored for each ele-
ment: the ith ambiguity can be tested against aperture parameter βi, with the vector
β = [β1, . . . , βm]
T chosen such that PF ≤ P¯F . A later section will discuss the ben-
efits of such element-specific aperture sizing. Second, one need not consider every
possible subset of IAB ambiguities, which, besides being computationally demand-
ing, would involve so many aperture tests that satisfying PF ≤ P¯F would require
such small βi values that PS would become intolerably small. Instead, one can
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achieve good performance even when considering only the subset corresponding to
the first q ≤ m elements of zˆ, where q is the number that pass the validation test.
This is because any of the commonly-accepted Z transform techniques (e.g., those
in [25,32]) tend to arrange zˆ to greatly increase (though not necessarily maximize)
PS relative to what would have been possible with the un-transformed system2. And
since the expected value of q can be shown to increase with PS , attempted fixing
from the first to last element of zˆ ensures that q will be maximized, or nearly so.
The new algorithm, generalized integer aperture bootstrapping (GIAB), is
given in pseudocode below. GIAB successively fixes ambiguities until it determines
that the next one cannot be fixed without PF exceeding P¯F . The output q is the
number of ambiguities fixed; q < m implies the (q + 1)th validation test failed, so
the last m− q ambiguities were left unfixed.
Whereas IAB has three outcome events (success, failure, and undecided),
GIAB has m + 2. These are defined in terms of the random variables zˇ and q as
follows, where z1:n indicates the vector composed of the first n elements of the
2For any of the common LAMBDA methods, the ordering ensures that σi|I < σi+1|I . The two
variants in [25] further enhance PS by enforcing the constraints that either σi|I < σj|I ,∀ j ≥ i or
σi|I > σj|I ,∀ j ≤ i. The first constraint means that the integers are ordered so that the each integer
fixed has the lowest conditional variance from among those not yet fixed. The second constraint
means that the ith ambiguity fixed has the maximum conditional variance from among the first i
ambiguities when conditioned on the other i− 1 ambiguities.
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Algorithm 2.2: GIAB (zˆ, L,β)
Input : zˆ ∈ Rm, L ∈ Rm×m, β ∈ [0, 1]m
Output: q ∈ {0, . . . ,m}, zˇ ∈ Zmin(q+1,m)
1 q = 0
2 zˆc = zˆ
3 for i = 1:m do
4 zˇi = bzˆcie
5 ˇci = zˆci − zˇi
6 if |ˇci| < βi2 then
7 q = i
8 for j = i+1:m do
9 zˆcj = zˆcj − ljiˇci
10 end
11 else
12 break
13 end
14 end
vector z:
F : zˇ1:q 6= z1:q, q ∈ {1, . . . ,m} (2.20a)
U : q = 0 (2.20b)
Si : zˇ1:i = z1:i, q = i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} (2.20c)
The failure event F occurs upon acceptance of any incorrect integers. The
undecided event U occurs when no ambiguity is fixed. There are m success events
Si defined for each possible number of correct integer fixes from 1 to m.
The aperture Ωζ ∈ Rm, ζ ∈ Zm, introduced earlier for IAB, can be gener-
alized for partial ambiguity resolution as Ωi,ζ ∈ Rm, ζ ∈ Zi, i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Let
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zˇ and q be the outputs of GIAB (zˆ, L,β). Then
Ωi,ζ = {zˆ ∈ Rm | zˇ1:i = ζ, q = i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}} (2.21)
In other words, Ωi,ζ is the set of all float ambiguity vectors whose first i elements
are mapped and validated by GIAB to ζ ∈ Zi, but whose (i + 1)th element is not
validated. Note that when βi = β for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, then Ωm,ζ = Ωζ, ζ ∈ Zm.
The success event Si can be defined in terms of Ωi,ζ as
Si : zˆ ∈ Ωi,ζ, ζ = z1:i, q = i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} (2.22)
and the failure event can be defined as
F : zˆ ∈
 ⋃
i∈{1,...,m}
 ⋃
ζ∈Zi\z1:i
Ωi,ζ
 (2.23)
The regions corresponding to the F , U , and Si events are illustrated in Fig. 2.2 for
m = 2.
2.2.4 Partial Ambiguity Resolution Probabilities
To assess GIAB’s theoretical performance, the probability of each possible
event must be computed. For the ith ambiguity reached during GIAB processing,
there are three possibilities: the fix is accepted correctly, accepted erroneously, or
rejected. Conditioned on the event that the first i − 1 integers have been fixed
correctly (i.e., zˇI = zI), the probabilities for these three events, for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
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Figure 2.2: Regions of the float ambiguity error,  ∈ Rm, that are mapped by GIAB
to failure, undecided, and success events for an example model with m = 2. Event
F results if one or more ambiguities are fixed incorrectly. Event Si occurs when
exactly i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} ambiguities are fixed and each of these is correct. Event U
occurs when the first ambiguity is rejected, leaving all ambiguities unfixed.
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follow from (2.19):
PCi = P
(
|ci| < βi
2
∣∣∣∣ zˇI = zI) = 2Φ(βi/2√di
)
− 1 (2.24a)
PEi =
∑
ζ∈Z\{0}
P
(
|ci − ζ| < βi
2
∣∣∣∣ zˇI = zI)
=
∑
ζ∈Z\{0}
(
Φ
(
βi
2
− ζ√
di
)
− Φ
(
−βi
2
− ζ√
di
))
(2.24b)
PRi = P
(
βi
2
≤ |ci|
∣∣∣∣ zˇI = zI) = 1− PEi − PCi (2.24c)
Note that, for i = 1, zˇI and zI become empty vectors and the conditioning has no
effect.
The failure event probability, PF , is computed by noting that one or more
fixing errors entail the failure event and that, if an ambiguity is rejected, no further
ambiguities are considered. Thus PEi only contributes to PF if all previous ambi-
guities were fixed correctly. The probability of the ith success event, PSi , can be
computed by applying similar logic. The probability of the undecided event, PU , is
simply PR1. The failure, success, and undecided probabilities are thus
PF = PE1 +
m∑
i=2
PEi
i−1∏
j=1
PCj (2.25a)
PSi =

m∏
j=1
PCj i = m
PR(i+1)
i∏
j=1
PCj i ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}
(2.25b)
PU = PR1 (2.25c)
Note that if βi = β for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, then PSm is equal to PS as defined for
IAB in (2.19a).
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A bound can be introduced to avoid the infinite sum in calculating PEi.
Consider the region βi
2
≤ |ci| ≤ 1 − βi2 , which is a subset of the rejection region
βi
2
≤ |ci|, so that PRi ≥ P
(
βi
2
≤ |ci| ≤ 1− βi2
∣∣ zˇI = zI). Appending to this
region the correct acceptance region |ci| < βi2 from (2.24a), and working out the
probability for the combined region, it follows that
PCi + PRi ≥ 1− 2Φ
(
βi/2− 1√
di
)
(2.26)
From this and (2.24c), one obtains the following upper bound on PEi:
PEi ≤ 2Φ
(
βi/2− 1√
di
)
(2.27)
Provided P¯F is small and the measurement model is strong enough that
√
di < 0.2,
as is typical, this bound on PEi is tight. The next section invokes the bound, together
with P¯F , to set the aperture parameters βi.
2.3 Setting the Integer Aperture Parameters
In IAB, PF is controlled by adjusting a single aperture parameter β. GIAB
is more flexible, as it allows a tailored parameter βi for each validation test. For
any specified P¯F , a parameter vector β = [β1, . . . , βm]T can almost always be
found so that GIAB’s probability of fixing all m integers,PSm , exceeds IAB’s PS .
This section shows how β can be computed analytically to satisfy PF ≤ P¯F , and
develops a technique that chooses β to nearly maximize PSm .
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2.3.1 Allocation from Probability of Failure
Each validation test that GIAB performs contributes to PF . The parameter
βi determines the amount of incorrect fixing risk that gets allocated to ith ambiguity,
from an overall risk budget P¯F . (The word risk here and elsewhere in this chapter
refers to the probability of an undesirable event.) Suppose wiP¯F is allocated to the
ith ambiguity, where wi < 1, and suppose the aperture parameters preceding βi
have all been set, which implies that PCj is known for all j ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1}. Then
the maximum allowable βi—the one that maximizes PSi subject to the allocation
wiP¯F—is found in two steps. First, PEi is written as a function of wiP¯F by isolating
its contribution to PF in (2.25a):
PEi(wiP¯F ) =

w1P¯F i = 1
wiP¯F∏i−1
j=1 PCj
i = 2, . . . ,m
(2.28)
Second, the correponding value of βi is found by treating (2.27) as an equality
and inverting it to find βi. Applying the constraint βi ∈ [0, 1], one has βi =
βmax (PEi, di), with
βmax (PEi, di) , min
[
1,max
[
0, 2
(
1 +
√
diΦ
−1 (PEi/2)
)]]
(2.29)
Note that if any βi = 0, then the ith and following ambiguities cannot be fixed
while satisfying PF ≤ P¯F . Conversely, if βi = 1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, then all m
ambiguities can be fixed while satisfying PF ≤ P¯F .
The functions PEi(wiP¯F ) and βmax (PEi, di), which are constructed from
well-known and readily-computable operations, constitute an analytical mapping
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from wiP¯F to βi. This analytical relationship is a key benefit of GIAB, as it allows
data-driven partial ambiguity resolution to be applied in safety-of-life systems that
must provably satisfy PF ≤ P¯F .
2.3.2 Optimization for Availability of Full Ambiguity Resolution
Consider how thewi should be chosen. Assuming a nonzero risk is allocated
to each ambiguity, and assuming the full risk budget P¯F is to be exhausted, the wi
should satisfy
0 < wi < 1, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and
m∑
i=1
wi = 1 (2.30)
One could allocate an equal fraction of P¯F to each of the m ambiguities by setting
wi = 1/m for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, but this may not be optimal in the sense of max-
imizing the probability PSm of correctly resolving all m ambiguities. The optimal
allocation problem can be posed in terms of β as
β∗ = arg max
β
[PSm (β)]
s.t. PF (β) ≤ P¯F and conditions in (2.30)
(2.31)
This problem can be approached by gradient ascent, but PSm and PF are
both non-convex functions of β and give rise to many local maxima in the region
of the global maximum. Thus, gradient ascent offers no guarantee of finding the
global optimum, besides which the gradient calculation for this problem is compu-
tationally expensive.
Mercifully, a nearly-optimal choice of the wi can be found by a simple
heuristic. Because both PSm and PF are functions of the conditional variances
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di, it is reasonable to compute the weights as functions of di as well. The most
general function satisfying (2.30) is
wi =
f (di)∑m
j=1 f (dj)
(2.32)
where f (di) is a weighting function. Guided by the intuition that more risk must
be allocated to the ambiguities that are most difficult to resolve (those having the
largest di), lest their resulting small βi reject fixing too often, four variants of f(di),
shown in the following table, are considered: Equal-weighting, σ-weighting, σ2-
weighting, and PE-weighting. Note that PE-weighting simply sets f(di) equal to
PEi from (2.27) with βi = 1.
Table 2.1: Weighting Function Alternatives Considered
Equal σ σ2 PE
f (di) 1
√
di di 2Φ
(
−1/2√
di
)
When tested on a variety of models with bootstrap probability of correct
fix ranging from .85 to .9999 and for a wide range of P¯F , it was found that PE-
weighting produces the highest PSm for all models studied, including cases of flat
spectra (e.g., max {di}m1 /min {di}m1 < 1.1), and spectra with significant variation
(e.g., max {di}m1 /min {di}m1 > 7). When performing gradient ascent optimization
starting from the PE-weighted β, or starting from a large number of random initial
β distributed across its whole range, there was never observed more than a 0.03%
increase in PSm . Moreover, compared to the common-parameter case in which βi =
36
β for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, the probability PSm for PE-weighting was never lower,
and almost always higher—often by several percent. PE-weighting can thus be
considered nearly optimal, and is the recommended strategy for aperture sizing. The
overall aperture sizing algorithm is given in the following pseudocode. Note that
even when the algorithm’s output β does not quite maximize PSm, it nevertheless
guarantees PF ≤ P¯F , which is most important for safety-of-life systems.
Algorithm 2.3: SetBeta
(
P¯F ,d
)
Input : P¯F ∈ [0, 1], d ∈ Rm
Output: β ∈ [0, 1]m
1 Σ = 0;
2 A = 1;
3 for i = 1:m do
4 PEi = 2Φ
(
− 1/2√
di
)
5 Σ = Σ + PEi
6 end
7 for i = 1:m do
8 wi =
PEi
Σ
9 βi = min
(
max
[
2
(
1 +
√
diΦ
−1
(
wiP¯F
2A
))
, 0
]
, 1
)
10 A =
(
2Φ
(
βi/2√
di
)
− 1
)
A
11 end
2.4 The GIAB Baseline
Analogous to the float baseline bˆ and the fixed baseline bˇ, a partially-fixed
baseline can be calculated from the inputs and outputs of GIAB. Let (2.14) be
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rewritten as
bˇ = bˆ−
m∑
j=1
Qj
bˆ zˆc
ˇcj
dj
(2.33)
whereQbˆ zˆc , Qbˆ zˆL
−T and whereQj
bˆ zˆc
denotes the jth column ofQbˆ zˆc . Rewriting
bˇ in this way reveals that each element of the sequentially-constrained ambiguity
residual ˇc makes a separate correction to bˆ in the direction defined by the vector
Qj
bˆ zˆc
. To obtain a partially-fixed baseline, one simply truncates the summation.
Thus, the baseline constrained only by the first i ambiguities, denoted bˇi, is
bˇi = bˆ−
i∑
j=1
Qj
bˆ zˆc
ˇcj
dj
(2.34)
Its covarianceQbˇi , assuming all fixed ambiguities are correctly fixed, can be derived
from (2.15):
Qbˇi = Qbˆ −
i∑
j=1
1
dj
Qj
bˆ zˆc
(
Qj
bˆ zˆc
)T
(2.35)
For high-integrity positioning, the probability distribution of the baseline
vector is of great importance. It can be shown that the float baseline bˆ ∼ N(0, Qbˆ).
On the other hand, the fixed IB baseline from (2.14) is distributed as an infinite sum
of Gaussians, though, like bˆ, it is unbiased [26].
Analysis of the baseline resulting from GIAB is complicated by the effects
of data-driven partial fixing. If, for some reason, one decides a priori to fix only
i ambiguities (e.g., based on the strength of the model), then, given that all fixed
ambiguities are fixed correctly, bˇi has a simple distribution:
bˇi| (zˇ1:i = z1:i) ∼ N(0, Qbˇi), i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
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One might expect the same distribution to apply for GIAB when q = i < m.
However, there is key difference between these two cases: q = i < m implies that
GIAB has rejected fixing the (i + 1)th ambiguity. The data-driven (a posteriori)
decision to reject yields a different baseline distribution than that of a priori partial
fixing:
bˇi| (zˇ1:i = z1:i, q = i < m)  N(0, Qbˇi)
To understand why, recall that q = i < m implies GIAB rejected fixing the (i+1)th
ambiguity upon finding that |ˇc(i+1)| ≥ β(i+1)/2, as fixing it would violate PF < P¯F .
Even so, the most likely fix for the (i+ 1)th ambiguity, given ˇc(i+1) and given that
zˇ1:i = z1:i, is the same one that would have been produced by IB, which GIAB
outputs in zˇi+1. The next most likely fix, which is the next nearest integer, and its
associated conditional ambiguity residual are
zˇi+1,alt = zˇi+1 + sgn
(
ˇc(i+1)
)
(2.36a)
ˇc(i+1),alt = ˇc(i+1) − sgn
(
ˇc(i+1)
)
(2.36b)
Equation (2.34) indicates that if the (i+ 1)th integer were to be fixed, the
adjustments to bˇi in the most likely and alternate cases would be
bˇi+1 − bˇi = −Q(i+1)bˆ zˆc
ˇc(i+1)
di+1
(2.37a)
bˇi+1,alt − bˇi = −Q(i+1)bˆ zˆc
ˇc(i+1),alt
di+1
(2.37b)
It is shown in Section 3.4.6 that either bˇi+1 or bˇi+1,alt is unbiased with prob-
ability near 1. It follows that, having examined ˇc(i+1), but having rejected the
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correction it offers, and the correction ˇc(i+1),alt offers, GIAB will, with probability
near 1, produce a biased bˇi. Therefore, for data-driven partial fixing, it is wrong—
and potentially hazardous—to assume the resulting constrained baseline estimate
is unbiased. For a complete discussion on the integrity implications of partial ambi-
guity resolution, and for development of the a priori and a posteriori partially-fixed
baseline distributions, see Ch. 3.
2.5 Validation via Monte Carlo Simulation
To validate the GIAB event probabilities PF , PU , and PSi ,∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
extensive Monte Carlo simulations were performed on float solution models with
varying measurement error but the same satellite geometry. For each model, the
simulation was initialized by computing the decorrelating Z-transform and using
PE-weighting to set the integer aperture parameters. Then a large sample was drawn
from the distribution described by (2.2) to generate the float solution errors, the
float baseline, and float ambiguities. The float ambiguities were then Z-transformed
and the GIAB algorithm was applied to the transformed float ambiguity solution.
Finally, the outputs were logged, including the number of correctly fixed samples,
tabulated by q, the number of incorrectly fixed samples, tabulated by the first errant
ambiguity, and the partially-fixed baseline error, tabulated by q.
The sample size for each simulation was chosen to ensure that a statistically
significant number of failures occurred or a significant number of solutions was
available for each value of q. This chapter’s theoretical event probabilities were then
compared to the simulated results. To examine the goodness of fit between theory
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and simulation, the differences between predicted and simulated probabilities were
calculated, normalized by the expected standard deviation in the measured rate.
Several models were simulated to illustrate a range of failure rates and fixing
probabilities. Only small models with 7 ambiguities are presented in full detail, but
similar results were obtained for m ∈ {14, 21, 28}. In the following tables, E is an
event, whether F , U , or Si for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, PE is the predicted event probability,
PˆE is the event probability as measured from the Monte Carlo simulation, and kPE is
the normalized difference between the predicted and estimated event probabilities.
The predicted probability of failure was computed using the bound on PEi given in
(2.27). The difference is normalized by the standard deviation of the Beta distribu-
tion, β (nMCPE, nMC (1− PE)), which is the posterior distribution of PE given the
Monte Carlo results. Thus,
kPE =
PˆE − PE√
PE(1−PE)
nMC
(2.38)
The value of kPE is interpreted as follows: if |kPE | < N , then the predicted and
measured probabilities differ by no more than N standard deviations.
Table 2.2 shows the simulation results for nMC = 4 × 108 Monte Carlo
samples from a float distribution with a bootstrap probability of correct fix PCF ,B =
1 − 2 × 10−5 for P¯F = 10−8. This strong model was chosen to validate the event
probabilities when partial fixing is rarely needed. Table 2.3 shows the simulation
results for nMC = 2.2 × 107 Monte Carlo samples from a float distribution with
a bootstrap probability of correct fix PCF ,B = 0.988 and P¯F = 10−5. This weak
model was chosen to validate the event probabilities when partial fixing must be
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Table 2.2: Predicted vs Simulated Event Probabilities for a Strong Model
E PE PˆE kPE
F 10−8 5e-9 1.0000
U 0.0007217 0.0007204 1.0098
S1 0.0004399 0.0004396 0.2180
S2 0.0005133 0.0005131 0.1440
S3 0.0011997 0.0012005 -0.4574
S4 0.0009000 0.0009023 -1.4966
S5 0.0018919 0.0018902 0.7913
S6 0.0003955 0.0003956 0.0896
S7 0.9939380 0.9939380 -0.0864
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employed frequently.
Table 2.3: Predicted vs Simulated Event Probabilities for a Weak Model
E PE PˆE kPE
F 0.00001 0.0000101 -0.2673
U 0.13872 0.138628 1.1858
S1 0.09308 0.093210 -2.2452
S2 0.08423 0.084117 1.9596
S3 0.09987 0.099910 -0.8364
S4 0.07162 0.071578 0.6782
S5 0.08010 0.080070 0.2955
S6 0.03362 0.033647 -0.7922
S7 0.39878 0.398801 -0.2348
As can be seen in Tables 2.2 and 2.3, both the strong and weak model pre-
dictions match the simulation results well.
2.6 Comparison against Existing IA Methods
To demonstrate the improved performance of the GIAB aperture sizing al-
gorithm, GIAB was compared with existing IA methods within Monte Carlo simu-
lations for m ∈ {2, 7}. For the m = 7 simulation, a single representative satellite
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geometry was used with the measurement covariance scaled in the same way as
described in section 2.5 to give a weak model that would test GIAB in the least fa-
vorable circumstance for comparison with the optimal IA method. IAB and GIAB
compare similarly to the m = 2 case, so results are not tabulated for IAB for com-
pactness. Table 2.4 shows the results for GIAB. Note the greatest benefit of GIAB
is in partial ambiguity resolution: whereas optimal IA correctly resolves the full set
of ambiguities less than 84.2% of the time, GIAB correctly fixes some ambiguities
almost 95% of the time, and more than half the ambiguities over 82% of time.
For the m = 2 simulation, the same set of 106 float ambiguity samples was
processed using the optimal IA method, the ellipsoidal IA method, IAB, and GIAB.
The results are visualized by a scatter plot of the float ambiguities in Fig. 2.3. Each
point is shaded according the results of the optimal IA method: dark gray points
were correctly fixed, light gray points were left floating, and large, red points were
fixed incorrectly.
The apertures of the ellipsoidal, IAB, GIAB, and optimal methods are plot-
ted over the scatter plot to illustrate the comparative probability of successfully fix-
ing all integers for P¯F = 10−5. The threshold for the optimal method was set using a
larger Monte Carlo simulation of 107 samples such that exactly nMC× P¯F −1 = 99
failures occur. This threshold was then used to determine the outcome of the opti-
mal IA method for the smaller simulations. For visualization, the optimal aperture
region was approximated by solving for its location along a polar grid with spacings
of 0.1◦.
It is visually apparent that both IAB, which applies a single threshold, and
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Table 2.4: Joint Probability Mass Function of GIAB (Rows) and Optimal IA
(Columns) Fixing Decision for Weak m = 7 Model
Sopt Uopt Fopt Marginal
S7,GIAB 0.6992 0.0064 0 0.7056
S6,GIAB 0.0009 0.0231 0 0.0239
S5,GIAB 0.0279 0.0253 5E-6 0.0532
S4,GIAB 0.0051 0.0360 7.5E-6 0.0411
S3,GIAB 0.0170 0.0340 0 0.0510
S2,GIAB 0.0227 0.0144 0 0.0370
S1,GIAB 0.0286 0.0089 0 0.0374
UGIAB 0.0403 0.0103 5.8E-5 0.0506
FGIAB 0 5E-5 2.8E-5 7.8E-5
Marginal 0.8415 0.1584 9.8E-5 1
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GIAB, which applies two different risk-allocated thresholds, are superior to ellip-
soidal IA for the model considered. There is also a visually perceptible improve-
ment from IAB to GIAB; the exact improvement is quantified in Tables 2.5 and 2.6.
The similarity between the GIAB and optimal apertures is clear. It is not visible,
but is important to note that the GIAB aperture is slightly wider than the optimal
aperture in the region of highest density. Since the optimal threshold must be set
by Monte Carlo simulation, it is possible that it will perform worse than GIAB in
practice though it is optimal in theory. This is the case for the results shown in Table
2.6.
Table 2.5 compares the baseline performance of IAB with a single aperture
threshold to that of the optimal IA estimator. This example was for a relatively lax
incorrect fix risk of P¯F = 10−5, so the performance is quite similar: the percent of
samples where IAB rejects a fix that the optimal method correctly accepts is only
0.26%. Compare these results to Table 2.6, in which the percent of samples where
GIAB rejects a fix that the optimal method correctly accepts is significantly lower,
0.0074%. Moreover, GIAB correctly accepts more fixes that the optimal method
rejects. The main advantage of GIAB over optimal IA is that GIAB allows partial
ambiguity resolution. GIAB correctly partially fixes 4.1% of all samples, all of
which are rejected by the optimal method.
2.7 Conclusions
A new data-driven CDGNSS partial ambiguity resolution and validation al-
gorithm has been developed analytically and validated with Monte Carlo simula-
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 Figure 2.3: Comparison of the integer aperture acceptance regions for integer aper-
ture bootstrapping (IAB), ellipsoidal IA, GIAB, and optimal IA. All apertures allow
the same expected number of incorrect fixes, but yield different rates of accepting
the correct fix. Listed in ascending order of success are the ellipsoidal, IAB, GIAB,
and optimal IA acceptance regions. There is a significant improvement from IAB
to GIAB as many more correct fixes are admitted. The optimal IA decisions only
differ from the GIAB decisions in a small fraction of cases. The scatter plot are
color coded by optimal IA event: dark gray for success, light gray for undecided,
and large red for failure.
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Table 2.5: Joint Probability Mass Function of IAB (Rows) and Optimal IA
(Columns) Fixing Decision for m = 2 Model
Sopt Uopt Fopt Marginal
SIAB 0.954108 0.001876 0 0.955984
UIAB 0.002623 0.041382 0 0.044005
FIAB 0 0 0.000011 0.000011
Marginal 0.956731 0.043258 0.000011 1
Table 2.6: Joint Probability Mass Function of GIAB (Rows) and Optimal IA
(Columns) Fixing Decision for m = 2 Model
Sopt Uopt Fopt Marginal
S2 0.956657 0.001791 0 0.958448
S1 0 0.041416 0 0.041416
UGIAB 0.000074 0.000051 0 0.000125
FGIAB 0 0 0.000011 0.000011
Marginal 0.956731 0.043258 0.000011 1
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tion. The new algorithm has advantages over the state-of-the-art in that (1) data-
driven methods offer improved availability of integrity over model-driven methods,
(2) the integrity risk due to incorrect fixing is precisely controlled analytically as
compared to functional approximation methods used with the ratio test and sim-
ilar integer aperture methods, and (3) it provides superior probability of success
when compared to IAB or ellispoidal IA and approaches that of optimal IA. In sim-
ulation testing, the new algorithm was shown to provide superior performance to
the current state-of-the-art methods for a range of measurement models. GIAB’s
partial fixing, together with its analytical connection between the allowable failure
rate and its validation thresholds, make GIAB attractive for safety-of-life systems
in challenging environments.
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Chapter 3
Data-Driven Position Domain Integrity for
Generalized Integer Aperture Bootstrapping
3.1 Introduction
1 State-of-the-art methods in high-integrity CDGNSS enforce IR constraints
in the position domain by accounting for baseline biases induced by incorrect in-
teger fixing. Two such methods are the Geometry Extra Redundant Almost Fixed
Solutions (GERAFS) [42] and the Enforced Position domain Integrity-risk of Cy-
cle resolution (EPIC) [17,18] algorithms. Both of these rely exclusively on a priori
error models to determine, before the measurements are processed, whether a fixed
solution or a float backup solution will be selected. This approach is termed model-
driven because the solution selection logic is entirely dependent on the prior error
model. Because GERAFS and EPIC attempt to bound IR using the a priori distri-
bution, they are inherently conservative. Their conservatism arises from the need
to protect against position domain biases induced by a large number of potentially-
incorrect fixes without the benefit of conditioning on the observed carrier-phase
1This chapter was based on
1. G. Nathan Green and Todd E. Humphreys. Position-domain integrity analysis for generalized
integer aperture bootstrapping. IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems,
2017. Submitted for review.
The author contributed all derivation, simulation, and analysis in that paper and in this chapter.
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measurements.
In contrast to the model-driven approach, data-driven methods exploit mea-
sured data to decide whether to accept the fixed or float solution. Conditioning
selection on the observed measurements reduces the risk of incorrect ambiguity
resolution. Foremost among data-driven techniques is the integer aperture (IA) ap-
proach [28]. In this approach, the integer ambiguity vector is first estimated by some
means, e.g., integer bootstrapping (IB) [26] or integer least squares (ILS) [34], after
which a test statistic is computed from the ambiguity residual, i.e., the difference
between the float and fixed ambiguities. Based on this statistic, a hypothesis test
decides whether to accept or reject the fixed solution.
IA bootstrapping (IAB) is a particularly simple type of IA estimation in
which the integer ambiguities are fixed via IB and the test statistic is produced by
a second application of IB, this time to a scaled-up version of the ambiguity resid-
ual [33]. If the statistic is the zero vector, the fixed solution is selected; otherwise
the float solution is selected. IAB is sub-optimal in two respects: First, IB does not
always find the maximum likelihood integer ambiguity, as opposed to ILS, which is
guaranteed to do so. Second, IAB fails to maximize the probability of successfully
fixing the ambiguities for a given probability of incorrectly fixing them. Although
sub-optimal, IB enjoys a significant advantage: its fixing probabilities are analyti-
cally calculable, which allows the residual scaling parameter to be set analytically
as a function of a desired probability of incorrect fix, or failure rate, P¯F . Crucially,
this property enables a system to provably satisfy the strict performance require-
ments of safety-of-life applications.
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It was noted in Section 2.4 that GIAB’s partially-integer-constrained base-
line estimate exhibits non-negligible biases, even when all fixed integers pass val-
idation. But no prior work has characterized these biases or assed their effect on
integrity risk.
This chapter makes four novel contributions to the literature: First, it shows
that baseline estimate biases are present in any data-driven partial ambiguity res-
olution algorithm that corrects the float baseline with the validated fixes. Second,
it develops and validates an analytical characterization of the a priori and a pos-
teriori distributions of the GIAB baseline. Third, it extends the position domain
integrity concepts originally developed for EPIC to data-driven algorithms for use
in safety-of-life applications. Fourth, it validates GIAB’s performance via Monte
Carlo simulation and compares this with EPIC.
3.2 Generalized Integer Aperture Bootstrapping Overview
The most important elements of Ch. 2 are collected in this overview for ease
of reference.
Beginning from the LAMBDA-decorrelated float solution, bˆ and zˆ (2.2),
GIAB’s objective is to fix and validate as many of the ambiguities as possible
while ensuring that the probability that a validated ambiguity is incorrect is less
than a specified level, P¯F . GIAB outputs the number of validated ambiguities,
q ∈ {0, . . . ,m}, and the vector, zˇ ∈ Zmin(q+1,m), whose first q elements are the
fixed and validated ambiguities, and whose (q + 1)th element, if q < m, is the first
fixed but rejected ambiguity.
52
The outputs of GIAB can be mapped to various events defined in terms of
the random variables zˇ and q. In the following event definitions, z1:n indicates the
vector composed of the first n elements of the vector z:
F : zˇ1:q 6= z1:q, q ∈ {1, . . . ,m} (3.1a)
U : q = 0 (3.1b)
Si : zˇ1:i = z1:i, q = i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} (3.1c)
Zi : zˇ1:i = z1:i, q = i ∈ {0, . . . ,m} (3.1d)
Ci : zˇ1:i = z1:i, i ∈ {1, ...,m} (3.1e)
Ri+1 : q = i < m (3.1f)
The failure event F occurs upon validation of any incorrect integers. The undecided
event U occurs when no ambiguity is fixed. There are m success events Si defined
for each possible number of correctly validated integer fixes from 1 to m. The
event Zi is identical to Si except that it includes the q = 0 (no fixes) case. Note
that the null vector zˇ1:0 is assumed to be identical to z1:0 so that Z0 = U . The
correct validation event Ci occurs when the first i ≥ 1 integers are fixed correctly,
irrespective of the value of q. The rejection event Ri+1 occurs when GIAB refuses
to fix the (i+ 1)th ambiguity.
GIAB requires that the variance of the float ambiguity be decomposed into
LDLT form such that
Qzˆ = LDL
T (3.2)
where L is a unit-lower triangular matrix and D is a diagonal matrix. The float
ambiguity can be modeled as the true ambiguity plus zero-mean Gaussian noise,
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zˆ = z + ,  ∼ N(0, Qzˆ). Multiplication by L−1 transforms  into a vector whose
elements are mutually uncorrelated: c , L−1, c ∼ N(0, D).The quantity c,
called the decorrelated float ambiguity error, plays a key role in the analysis that
follows.
GIAB takes as input a vector, β, called the aperture parameter vector, that
determines the validation threshold for each ambiguity. β also determines the prob-
abilities of the failure, success, and undecided events, PF , PSi , and PU . β is set as
a function of D that ensures PF < P¯F . GIAB can be represented as the function
[q, zˇ] = GIAB (zˆ, L,β) (3.3)
The event probabilities, PF , PSi , and PU , are defined in (2.24) and (2.25).
These probabilities are determined by β, which is set as a function ofD (Algorithm
2.3) that ensures PF < P¯F .
Let r = min{q + 1,m} for notational simplicity. The ambiguity residual is
defined as ˇ , zˆ1:r − zˇ. Note that if zˇ = z1:r, then ˇ = . Denote the upper
r × r sub-matrix of L as L1:r,1:r. An important quantity, called the sequentially-
constrained ambiguity residual, is defined as ˇc , L−11:r,1:rˇ. This vector has a con-
venient property: if the first i integer ambiguities GIAB fixes are correctly fixed
(i.e., if zˇ1:i = z1:i), then the (i+ 1)th element of ˇc, denoted ˇc(i+1), is uncorrelated
with the previous i elements. This property will be exploited later on. GIAB de-
cides whether to fix the ith ambiguity based on the value of ˇci. It operates in such
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a way that
|ˇci| ≤ βi
2
for i ∈ {1, . . . , q}, q > 0
βi
2
< |ˇci| ≤ 1
2
for i = q + 1, q < m
(3.4)
In other words, all i ∈ {1, . . . , q} ambiguities that GIAB validates have small
sequentially-constrained ambiguity residuals ˇci, but the (q+1)th ambiguity, which
GIAB refuses to fix (assuming q < m), has ˇc(q+1) too large for GIAB to confidently
fix. Note that a rounding operation within GIAB ensures |ˇci| ≤ 1/2.
If the full set of ambiguities is fixed and validated, the float baseline can be
constrained by the float ambiguity residual, resulting in the so-called fixed baseline
estimate:
bˇ = bˆ−Qbˆ zˆQ−1zˆ ˇ
= bˆ−Qbˆ zˆ
(
L−TD−1L−1
)
Lˇc
= bˆ−Qbˆ zˆL−TD−1ˇc
= bˆ−Qbˆ zˆcD−1ˇc
(3.5)
where Qbˆ zˆc , Qbˆ zˆL
−T .
The distribution of the fully-fixed baseline conditioned on a particular fixed
ambiguity zˇ = z + ∆z is [32]
(
bˇ |zˇ = z + ∆z ) ∼ N (b+Qbˆ zˆQ−1zˆ ∆z, Qbˇ) (3.6)
where Qbˇ , Qbˆ − Qbˆ zˆcD−1QTbˆ zˆc . Thus, when the integer ambiguity is fixed cor-
rectly (∆z = 0), the fully-fixed baseline has a Gaussian distribution whose mean
equals the true baseline b.
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3.3 Prior Distribution of the GIAB Baseline
Analogous to the float baseline bˆ and the fixed baseline bˇ, a partially-fixed
baseline, denoted b¯, can be calculated from the inputs and outputs of GIAB. The a
priori and a posteriori distributions of b¯ are important performance indicators. This
section derives the a priori distribution of b¯.
Let Qbˆ zˆcj indicate the jth column of the matrix Qbˆ zˆc , and dj the jth entry
on the diagonal of D. Because D is diagonal, (3.5) can be written
bˇ = bˆ−
m∑
j=1
Qbˆzˆcj
ˇcj
dj
(3.7)
The baseline constrained by only the first i ambiguities, written bˇi, can be calculated
by truncating the summation in (3.7) at i:
bˇi = bˆ−
i∑
j=1
Qbˆzˆcj
ˇcj
dj
(3.8)
The event q = i < m implies that GIAB could not fix the (i + 1)th am-
biguity without violating the specified probability of failure. For the moment, let
b¯ = bˇq be GIAB’s partially-fixed baseline solution; alternative assignments for b¯
will be explored later on. Denote by F c the complement of the failure event, F ,
and let fb¯|F and fb¯|F c be the probability density functions (PDFs) of b¯ conditioned
respectively on F and F c. It follows from the total probability theorem that the
prior (unconditioned) PDF of the partially-fixed baseline b¯ is
fb¯ (ξ) = fb¯|F c (ξ) (1− PF ) + fb¯|F (ξ)PF (3.9)
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Since, by design, PF ≤ P¯F  1, momentarily neglect the second term on the right-
hand side of (3.9). This term is not important for the average performance of the
GIAB algorithm, though it is central to position domain integrity considerations in
Section 3.6. A detailed expression for fb¯|F c (ξ), from the first term, is derived along
with other conditional PDFs in the following section.
3.4 Conditional distributions of the Generalized Integer Aper-
ture Baseline
Various conditional distributions of b¯ offer valuable insight into its behavior
under partial ambiguity resolution. This section presents a conceptual overview of
the various distributions, followed by detailed derivations of the same.
3.4.1 Conceptual Overview
Consider fb¯|Ci(ξ), the PDF of b¯ conditioned on GIAB correctly resolv-
ing the first i ambiguities. Note that this conditioning makes no assumption that
GIAB resolved only i ambiguities; in fact, GIAB may have resolved more than i—
correctly or not. The conditioning on Ci assumes only that the first i were correctly
resolved. One would expect this conditional PDF to be Gaussian with a mean of
b, since, as (2.16) indicates, the fully-fixed baseline bˇ conditioned on ∆z = 0 is
Gaussian with mean b. Indeed, this turns out to be the case.
Now consider fb¯|Zi(ξ) for i < m. The event Zi implies zˇ1:i = z1:i but
when i < m it further implies that GIAB refused to fix one or more ambiguities.
Thus, conditioning on Zi when i < m indicates that the magnitude of the (i +
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1)th sequentially-constrained ambiguity residual ˇc(i+1) was larger than βi+1/2. No
assumption is made about the particular value of ˇc(i+1), only that it was too large
to confidently fix the corresponding integer. In this case will fb¯|Zi(ξ) be Gaussian
with mean b? The answer is no: fb¯|Zi(ξ) has mean b but is not Gaussian. This can
be explained by considering (3.8) and recognizing that, although ˇc(i+1) being large
has no bearing on ˇcj for j ∈ {1, . . . , i} (because these are uncorrelated with ˇc(i+1)
under Zi), it does imply something about bˆ, namely, that its PDF does not have a
mode at b: the most probable values of bˆ are offset from b.
Finally, consider fb¯|ˇc(i+1),Zi(ξ|ε), which is the PDF of b¯ conditioned on
Zi for i < m and on the particular value of the sequentially-constrained ambiguity
residual, ˇc(i+1), that caused GIAB to refuse to fix the (i+1)th ambiguity. Somewhat
surprisingly, this PDF turns out to be neither Gaussian nor of mean b. This key
result, unknown in the existing literature, is critical because fb¯|ˇc(i+1),Zi(ξ|ε) informs
decision making about b¯: it is the best indicator of whether a particular b¯ will be
accurate enough for a high-integrity application.
Manipulation in the following subsections leads to detailed expressions for
fb¯|F c(ξ), fb¯|Zi(ξ), and fb¯|ˇc(i+1),Zi(ξ|ε).
3.4.2 Finding fb¯|F c
The conditional PDF fb¯|F c , which appears in (3.9), can be written in terms
of fb¯|Zi(ξ), the PDF of b¯ conditioned on successful validation of q = i ambiguities,
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as follows:
fb¯|F c (ξ) =
m∑
i=0
P (Zi|F c)fb¯|Zi (ξ)
=
m∑
i=0
P (Zi, F
c)
P (F c)
fb¯|Zi (ξ)
=
m∑
i=0
PZi
1− PF fb¯|Zi (ξ)
(3.10)
where PZi is the probability of the event Zi, and where the final simplification
follows from Zi ⊂ F c.
3.4.3 Finding fb¯|Zi(ξ)
The PDF fb¯|Zi(ξ), which appears in (3.10), can be expressed in terms of
GIAB’s output zˇ ∈ Zr, where r = min(m, q + 1). When conditioned on Zi with
i < m, the first i ambiguities in zˇ, are correct, but the (i + 1)th may not be;
in other words, zˇ = [z1, . . . , zi, zi+1 + ∆z]T for some ∆z ∈ Z. Recalling that
ˇc , L−11:r,1:r(zˆ1:r − zˇ), and recognizing L−11:r,1:r as unit lower triangular, then given
Zi it follows that ˇc(1:i) = c(1:i) , L−11:i,1:i(zˆ1:i−z1:i) and that ˇc(i+1) = c(i+1)−∆z.
From standard probability theory, the PDF of the difference ˇc(i+1) = c(i+1) −∆z
can be expressed in terms of the joint PDF of c(i+1) and ∆z, which, in turn can be
expressed as the product of the conditional and marginal PDFs of ∆z and c(i+1),
respectively:
f ˇc(i+1)|Zi(ε) =
∑
k∈Z
fc(i+1),∆z|Zi (ε+ k, k)
=
∑
k∈Z
f∆z|c(i+1),Zi (k|ε+ k) fc(i+1)|Zi (ε+ k)
(3.11)
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This expression can be simplified by noting from (3.4) that under Zi the rejected
sequentially-constrainted ambiguity residual ˇc(i+1) satisfies
βi+1
2
<
∣∣ˇc(i+1)∣∣ ≤ 1
2
Expressed another way, the support of ˇc(i+1) under Zi is
Ai+1 ,
{
ε
∣∣∣∣βi+12 < |ε| ≤ 12
}
Thus, given that ˇc(i+1) = c(i+1) −∆z ∈ Ai+1, the conditioning on c(i+1) = ε+ k
in (3.11) implies ∆z = k. (The condition |ε| = 1/2 upsets this unique mapping but
happens with probability 0.) Therefore,
f∆z|c(i+1),Zi (k|ε+ k) = 1 ∀k ∈ Z, ∀ε ∈ Ai+1
and (3.11) simplifies to
fˇc(i+1)|Zi(ε) =
∑
k∈Z
fc(i+1)|Zi (ε+ k) (3.12)
With these preliminaries, fb¯|Zi (ξ) can be constructed as the marginal of the joint
PDF of b¯ and ˇc(i+1), and the latter can be expressed in terms of a sum of joint PDFs
with c(i+1) by the same reasoning that led to (3.12):
fb¯|Zi (ξ) =
∫
Ai+1
fb¯,ˇc(i+1)|Zi (ξ, ε) dε
=
∫
Ai+1
∑
k∈Z
fb¯,c(i+1)|Zi (ξ, ε+ k) dε
(3.13)
60
0 1-1
2

1
2


2

1
2

2
2

 1
2

  1
2

 2
2


c( 1)i
Figure 3.1: The rejection event Ri+1 is triggered when c(i+1) falls within the indi-
cated bands. For compactness, βi+1 is abbreviated as β.
3.4.4 Finding fb¯,c(i+1)|Zi (ξ, ε+ k)
To find fb¯,c(i+1)|Zi (ξ, ε+ k), which appears in (3.13), it is helpful to express
the rejection event Ri+1 in terms of c(i+1), as follows:
Ri+1 : c(i+1) ∈ {ε+ k | ε ∈ Ai+1, k ∈ Z}
Fig. 3.1 illustrates the bands of c(i+1) that trigger rejection. In the context of (3.13),
where conditioning is on Zi with i < m [the (i + 1)th ambiguity was rejected], Zi
is the intersection of the correct validation event Ci and the rejection event Ri+1.
Accordingly, the PDF fb¯,c(i+1)|Zi (ξ, ε) is identical to fb¯,c(i+1)|Ci (ξ, ε) but with two
modifications: (1) support of c(i+1) is restricted to Ri+1, and (2) a normalization
by PRi+1 , given in (2.24c), is applied to ensure the PDF integrates to unity. Let
1Ri+1(ε) be the indicator function for the rejection event, equal to unity for those
values of ε that trigger Ri+1, and zero otherwise. Then the joint PDF is
fb¯,c(i+1)|Zi (ξ, ε) =
1Ri+1(ε)
PRi+1
fb¯,c(i+1)|Ci (ξ, ε) (3.14)
To find fb¯,c(i+1)|Ci (ξ, ε) note that, under the event Ci, bˇi and c(i+1) are jointly
Gaussian:  bˇi
c(i+1)
 ∼ N

 ξ
ε
 ;
 b
0
 , Qbˇic(i+1)
 (3.15)
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with
Qbˇic(i+1) =
 Qbˇi Qbˆzˆc(i+1)
QT
bˆzˆc(i+1)
di+1
 (3.16)
where Qbˆzˆc(i+1) is the (i+ 1)th column of Qbˆzˆc , introduced in (2.14), and
Qbˇi = Qbˆ −
i∑
j=1
1
dj
Qbˆ zˆcj
(
Qbˆ zˆcj
)T
(3.17)
is found by exploiting the independence of each element of c. Then the conditional
mean error of b¯ = bˇi, given Ci and c(i+1) = ε + k, follows from the standard
expression for the Gaussian conditional mean:
µk(ε) , E
[
b¯− b ∣∣c(i+1) = ε+ k, Ci ]
= Qbˆzˆc(i+1)
(
ε+ k
di+1
) (3.18)
Its covariance is found by extending the summation in (3.17) to (i+ 1):
cov
(
b¯
∣∣c(i+1) = ε+ k, Ci ) = Qbˇi+1 (3.19)
Hence the partially-fixed baseline b¯, when conditioned on c(i+1) and Ci, is Gaus-
sian distributed and biased away from the true baseline b by µk(ε):
fb¯|c(i+1),Ci (ξ|ε+ k) = N(ξ; b+ µk(ε), Qbˇi+1) (3.20)
Then, recognizing that c ∼ N(0, D) implies
fc(i+1)|Ci(ε) = N(ε; 0, di+1) (3.21)
and factoring the joint PDF in (3.14) into its conditional-times-marginal form yields
this subsection’s desired PDF:
f b¯,c(i+1)|Zi (ξ, ε+ k) =
1Ri+1(ε)
PRi+1
N(ξ; b+ µk(ε), Qbˇi+1)N(ε+ k; 0, di+1)
(3.22)
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Moreover, substituting (3.22) into (3.13), yields fb¯|Zi , and substituting (3.13) into
(3.10) yields a detailed expression for fb¯|F c:
fb¯|F c (ξ) =
PSm
1− PF N(ξ; b, Qbˇm)
+
m−1∑
i=0
PZi/PRi+1
1− PF
×
∑
k∈Z
∫
Ai+1
N(ξ; b+ µk(ε), Qbˇi+1)N(ε+ k; 0, di+1)dε
3.4.5 Finding fb¯|ˇc(i+1),Zi(ξ|ε)
After the foregoing steps, one can find the important PDF fb¯|ˇc(i+1),Zi(ξ|ε)
starting with
fb¯|ˇc(i+1),Zi(ξ|ε) =
fb¯,ˇc(i+1)|Zi (ξ, ε)
fˇc(i+1)|Zi(ε)
(3.23)
Substituting the integrand of (3.13) for the numerator and (3.12) for the denomina-
tor yields
fb¯|ˇc(i+1),Zi(ξ|ε) =
∑
k∈Z fb¯,c(i+1)|Zi (ξ, ε+ k)∑
j∈Z fc(i+1)|Zi (ε+ j)
(3.24)
Now substituting (3.22) and (3.21), where the normalization for the rejection event
cancels out, and constraining ε ∈ Ai+1 to eliminate the indicator functions, yields
f b¯|ˇc(i+1),Zi(ξ|ε) =
=
∑
k∈ZN(ξ; b+ µk(ε), Qbˇi+1)N(ε+ k; 0, di+1)∑
j∈ZN(ε+ j; 0, di+1)
(3.25)
This PDF can be interpreted as a mixture of Gaussian densities with different means
but equal variances. The mixture probabilities are in fact the conditional probabili-
ties that ∆z = k given the sequentially-constrainted ambiguity residual ˇc(i+1) and
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the event Zi:
pk(ε) , P (∆z = k|ˇc(i+1) = ε ∈ Ai+1, Zi)
=
N(ε+ k; 0, di+1)∑
j∈ZN(ε+ j; 0, di+1)
, ε ∈ Ai+1
(3.26)
Simplifying (3.25) with the mixture probability notation of (3.26) yields, for ε ∈
Ai+1,
fb¯|ˇc(i+1),Zi(ξ|ε) =
∑
k∈Z
pk(ε) ·N(ξ; b+ µk(ε), Qbˇi+1) (3.27)
3.4.6 Discussion
Two important observations can be drawn from the foregoing conditional
distributions. First consider (3.27). Note that pk(ε) and µk(ε) are evaluated only
for ε 6= 0, since ε ∈ Ai+1, which does not contain the origin. From (3.18), one
observes that, for ε 6= 0 and assumingQbˆzˇc(i+1) is nonzero, the biasµk(ε) is nonzero
for any value of k ∈ Z. Thus, the means of the Gaussian PDFs that get summed in
(3.27) are all shifted away from the true baseline b. It is possible for a weighting
function pk(ε) to be chosen to counteract this shifting and thereby restore symmetry
in fb¯|ˇc(i+1),Zi(ξ|ε), but the actual weighting that applies, given by (3.26), does not
do this. As a result, fb¯|ˇc(i+1),Zi(ξ|ε) is asymmetric about b with respect to ξ.
To be explicitly clear, the PDF of the partially-fixed baseline b¯ = bˇq that
results from correction of the float baseline bˆ with GIAB-produced ˇcj , as in (3.8)
with i = q < m, when conditioned on ˇc(i+1) = ε ∈ Ai+1, will not have a mean
coincident with the true baseline b even when all validated ambiguity fixes are cor-
rect.
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The second important observation is that, for i < m, fb¯|Zi (ξ) given by
(3.13) is symmetric about b but lacks a mode at b. To see this, note that fb¯|Zi (ξ)
can be written
fb¯|Zi (ξ) =
∫
Ai+1
fb¯|ˇc(i+1),Zi(ξ|ε)fˇc(i+1)|Zi(ε) dε (3.28)
with fb¯|ˇc(i+1),Zi(ξ|ε) given by (3.27) and fˇc(i+1)|Zi(ε) by (3.12). The first of these,
fb¯|ˇc(i+1),Zi(ξ|ε), is symmetric about b when integrated over ε because both pk(ε)
from (3.26) and µk(ε) from (3.18) are symmetric about the origin with respect to
ε when summed over all k ∈ Z. The second, fˇc(i+1)|Zi(ε), is symmetric about the
origin with respect to ε because the summand fc(i+1)|Zi(ε + k) of (3.12), with ε
restricted to Ai+1, is simply a normalized version of fc(i+1)|Ci(ε + k) from (3.21).
Thus, since fc(i+1)|Ci(ε+k) andAi+1 are symmetric with respect to ε, so is the PDF
fˇc(i+1)|Zi(ε). Taken together, these facts imply that fb¯|Zi (ξ) is symmetric about b.
Critically however, the support Ai+1 does not contain the origin, so µk(ε) 6= 0 for
all ε ∈ Ai+1 and all k ∈ Z. This implies that, although fb¯|Zi (ξ) with i < m is
symmetric about b, it does not have a mode at b.
The above two observations can be understood intuitively as follows: GIAB
refusing to fix the (i+1)th ambiguity indicates the float ambiguity zˆ is biased away
from z, which implies the float baseline bˆ is biased away from b. If GIAB with
b¯ = bˇi fixes only i = q < m ambiguities, the correction to the float baseline given
by (3.8) is incomplete, leaving some residual bias in b¯. When b¯ is conditioned
on the particular value ˇc(i+1) = ε ∈ Ai+1 under Zi, the bias manifests as an ε-
dependent shift of the mean away from b. When b¯ is conditioned only on Zi, the
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bias manifests as a symmetric exodus of probability density away from b, leaving
no mode at b. Figures of these distributions will be presented in the next subsection.
Note that the above reasoning is not unique to GIAB: the conditional PDF
of b¯will behave similarly for any data-driven partial ambiguity resolution algorithm
that corrects the float baseline with the validated fixes.
3.4.7 GIAB variants
The foregoing conditional PDFs and discussion assume b¯ = bˇi with i = q,
which, according to (3.8), implies the float baseline bˆ is only corrected by the q
sequentially-constrained ambiguity residuals ˇc(1:q) that pass validation (those satis-
fying |ˇci| ≤ βi/2). If q < m, the next sequentially-constrained ambiguity residual,
ˇc(q+1), is ignored, which means that the component of bˆ that might have been cor-
rected by ˇc(q+1) is left unchanged at its float value. This approach, hereafter called
float GIAB, is the typical practice in the existing literature on partial ambiguity res-
olution. However, the existing literature’s calculation of integrity risk IR does not
appear to recognize that b¯ = bˇq is biased as described above [3, 4, 16].
Setting b¯ = bˇq (thus ignoring ˇc(q+1)) is of course not the only way to handle
the first ambiguity that fails validation. This paper considers three variants of GIAB,
each distinguished by its treatment of the (q + 1)th ambiguity. The first is float
GIAB, described above. The second, called MAP GIAB by analogy to maximum
a posteriori estimation, applies the most likely fix candidate, which, given GIAB’s
operation as defined in [11], is equivalent to choosing b¯ = bˇq+1 for q < m. The
PDF fb¯|ˇc(i+1),Zi(ξ|ε) for b¯ = bˇq+1 is the same as that of the float variant (for which
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b¯ = bˇq), except that all µk(ε) are shifted by the (i+1)th correction in (3.8), namely
−Qbˆzˆc(i+1)
ˇc(i+1)
di+1
. Recalling that c(i+1) = ˇc(i+1) + ∆z, one notes that the additional
correction removes the fractional part from c(i+1), leaving
µk(ε) = Qbˆzˆc(i+1)
k
di+1
(MAP GIAB) (3.29)
which is zero if ∆z = k = 0. [The argument ε in µk(ε) is retained for functional
consistency with (3.18).] Thus, for b¯ = bˇq+1, the conditional PDF fb¯|ˇc(i+1),Zi(ξ|ε)
is unbiased about b if the non-validated fix is correct. MAP GIAB monitors the
effect of incorrect fixes on IR by calculating each alternate fix’s probability and
position domain bias. This approach is similar to the concept of position domain
integrity (PDI) in the EPIC and GERAFS algorithms.
The third variant of GIAB, called MMSE GIAB by analogy to minimum
mean squared error estimation, computes a weighted average of the MAP GIAB
baseline solution and the alternative fixed solutions. Because the baseline correc-
tions are applied linearly, MMSE GIAB’s partially-fixed baseline b¯ can be written
b¯ = bˇi −Qbˆzˆc(i+1)
ε+
∑
j∈Z pj(ε)j
di+1
(MMSE GIAB) (3.30)
This baseline solution is analogous to the Best Integer Equivariant (BIE) estimator
of [5, 41], with the difference that MMSE GIAB limits the number of fixes consid-
ered by sizing the aperture according to [11].
The ideal corrected baseline, which has a zero-mean-error PDF if ∆z = k,
is
b¯ideal = bˇi −Qbˆzˆc(i+1)
ε+ k
di+1
(3.31)
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The bias in the MMSE solution is thus
µk(ε) = b¯− b¯ideal (MMSE GIAB)
= Qbˆzˆc(i+1)
k −∑j∈Z jpj(ε)
di+1
= Qbˆzˆc(i+1)
∑
j∈Z(k − j)pj(ε)
di+1
(3.32)
where the last equality makes use of
∑
j∈Z pj(ε) = 1.
For small values of ε, p0(ε) pj(ε), ∀j 6= 0, meaning that the MAP fix is
much more likely than the alternatives, in which case the MMSE and MAP GIAB
baselines will differ only slightly. At the other extreme, in the zero-probability
event that |ˇc(i+1)| = 1/2, the MMSE and float GIAB baselines are equivalent.
Analysis has shown that when PCi+1 > 0.7, which is attainable for even
relatively weak models, neglecting all but the two most likely fix candidates for
the (i + 1)th ambiguity raises the integrity risk by less than PEi+1 for all values
of di+1. This makes the third most likely fix, and all less likely fixes, negligi-
bly likely. In particular, when PCi+1 > 0.7 the three highest values of pk(ε) are
p0(ε) > p−sgn(ε)(ε)  psgn(ε)(ε). Neglecting all but the two most likely fixes, the
partially-fixed baseline b¯ for each of the three GIAB variants can be approximated
by the following conditional PDF, with µk(ε) given by (3.18), (3.29), or (3.32), as
appropriate:
fb¯|ˇc(i+1),Zi(ξ|ε) ≈
∑
k∈{0,−sgn()}
pk(ε) ·N(ξ; b+ µk(ε), Qbˇi+1) (3.33)
The PDFs of (3.33), (3.13), and (3.10) are illustrated in Figs. 3.2, 3.3, and
3.4, respectively. The PDFs have been shifted so the horizontal axis’s origin coin-
cides with the component value of the true baseline b. Note that the MMSE GIAB
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Figure 3.2: A single component of fb¯|ˇc(i+1),Zi(b+ ξ|ε) from (3.33) for float, MAP,
and MMSE GIAB for q = i < m and a large ambiguity residual ε. Because
the distributions differ only by the variant-specific bias µk(ε), the three PDFs are
merely shifted versions of each other, with that of MMSE GIAB between those of
float and MAP GIAB.
PDF in Fig. 3.2 lies between those of the MAP and float variants. Note also that the
float GIAB PDF in Fig. 3.3 is bimodal, with both modes shifted away from zero,
whereas both MAP and MMSE GIAB have strong modes at zero but wider tails.
Finally, observe from Figs. 3.3 and 3.4 that MMSE GIAB has narrower tails than
MAP GIAB. This is because MAP GIAB does not change its baseline estimate for
large residuals like MMSE GIAB does.
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Figure 3.3: A single component of fb¯|Zi (b+ ξ) for float, MAP, and MMSE GIAB
with q = i < m, plotted with a log-scaled vertical axis. Float GIAB has a symmet-
ric, bimodal PDF. MAP GIAB has a symmetric PDF with a dominant, zero-mean
central mode and heavy tails due to incorrect fixes. MMSE GIAB has a lower
probability of large errors than does MAP GIAB at the expense of a slight increase
in the probability of moderately-sized errors. In the lightly-shaded region, MAP
GIAB has higher density than MAP GIAB, and vice versa in the darker region.
3.5 Validation of Baseline Distributions
In recognition of the possibility that the derived conditional PDFs of b¯ suffer
from some error in reasoning or probabilistic book-keeping, extensive Monte Carlo
simulations were conducted to cross-check the analytical expressions. A float solu-
tion model was chosen with eight satellites above a 5◦ mask. The simulation was
initialized by computing the decorrelating Z-transform and setting the integer aper-
ture according to the optimization described in [11]. A total of 4×108 Monte Carlo
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Figure 3.4: A single component of fb¯|F c (b+ ξ) for float, MAP, and MMSE GIAB,
plotted with a log-scaled vertical axis. Float GIAB has strong but narrow tails. Its
central mode results from the probability of fixing all m ambiguities. MAP and
MMSE GIAB both have a strong central mode and tails that are wider but lower
than those of float GIAB. MMSE GIAB has smoother and narrower tails than MAP
GIAB.
samples were then drawn from the float distribution described by (2.2) to generate
the float solution errors, including the float baseline and float ambiguities. Each
sample float ambiguity vector was then Z-transformed and fed through the GIAB
algorithm. All GIAB outputs were logged, including the number of correctly fixed
samples, the number of incorrectly fixed samples, and the partially-fixed baseline
error tabulated by q.
Appropriate histograms of the simulated outcomes were then compared
with the analytical PDFs for fb¯|F c(ξ), fb¯|Zi(ξ), and fb¯|ˇc(i+1),Zi(ξ|ε) and for float,
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Figure 3.5: A single component of fb¯|F c (b+ ξ) for the theoretical PDF of MAP
GIAB (dashed line) and the empirical (simulated) histogram (solid line), plotted in
log scale for m = 7, P¯F = 10−8, and a Monte Carlo sample size of 4 × 108. The
underlying model has an IB probability of correct fix equal to 1− 2× 10−5. As the
PDFs are symmetric about zero, only the positive portion is shown. Clearly, there
is strong agreement between the analytical and simulated distributions. Note that
because the plot’s vertical axis is log scaled, small differences are exaggerated at
low probabilities.
MAP, and MMSE GIAB. Fig. 3.5 shows excellent agreement between the empiri-
cal (simulated) and analytical fb¯|F c(ξ) for MAP GIAB. Similarly good agreement
was found with the other two distributions and the other two GIAB variants. The
model underlying Fig. 3.5 is relatively strong: its integer bootstrapping probability
of correct fix is 1− 2× 10−5 for a specified failure probability P¯F = 10−8. Several
weak models and other strong models were also studied, all of varying geometry.
Each case showed excellent agreement with the derived PDFs.
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3.6 Data-Driven Position Domain Integrity
The defining characteristic of high-integrity CDGNSS techniques appropri-
ate for safety-of-life systems is their ability to strictly bound the probability of large
position domain errors (errors in the estimate of the baseline vector b) even in the
event of incorrect fixes. This is the essence of position domain integrity (PDI). For
each component of b, the risk R that the component’s error exceeds the ALmust be
monitored. Let b represent a particular component of b and b¯ its estimate, whether
fully or partially fixed. Then R is defined as
R , P
(∣∣b¯− b∣∣ > AL) (3.34)
If R > ¯IR, where ¯IR is a specified integrity risk, an alert must be raised.
3.6.1 Position Domain Integrity in EPIC
The EPIC algorithm protects solution integrity by evaluating the a priori
conditional IR for the case that the ambiguities are fixed correctly and for s cases
of incorrect fix [17, 18]. EPIC produces tighter bounds on IR than GERAFS for
any error model, so EPIC is considered to the exclusion of GERAFS in this paper.
Define E0 as the event that the chosen ambiguity fix is correct, and Ek as the event
that the kth alternative fix is correct. Let Rk = P
(∣∣b¯− b∣∣ > AL∣∣Ek) ≤ 1 be the
conditional risk of excess error given the event Ek. The total risk is then
R =
s∑
k=0
RkP (Ek) +
∞∑
k=s+1
RkP (Ek) (3.35)
Define E∞ as the event that the correct fix was neither the chosen fix nor
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among the s alternative fix candidates; i.e.,
E∞ ,
∞⋃
k=s+1
Ek =
(
s⋃
k=0
Ek
)c
(3.36)
where (·)c indicates the set complement.
A bound on the risk of excess error can be derived by conservatively assum-
ing that any incorrect fix not among the s considered will cause excess error, i.e.,
assuming Rk = 1,∀k > s. This leads to the bound used by EPIC to monitor risk of
excess error:
REPIC ≤ P (E∞) +
s∑
k=0
RkP (Ek)
≤ 1−
s∑
k=0
P (Ek) +
s∑
k=0
RkP (Ek)
≤ 1−
s∑
k=0
(1−Rk)P (Ek)
(3.37)
In the EPIC algorithm, the event probabilities are the a priori fixing proba-
bilities for IB:
P (Ek) =
m∏
j=1
(
Φ
(
1
2
− L−1j ∆zk√
dj
)
− Φ
(
−1
2
− L−1j ∆zk√
dj
))
(3.38)
where ∆zk is the kth candidate fix ambiguity error vector and L−1j is the jth row of
the matrix L−1. Assuming zero-mean Gaussian measurements, the conditional PDI
risk for excess error in a particular direction is
Rk = Φ
(
AL− µk
σb¯
)
− Φ
(−AL− µk
σb¯
)
(3.39)
where µk is the desired component of the bias in (2.16) for fix error vector ∆zk,
and σ2
b¯
is the variance of that component.
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3.6.2 Position Domain Integrity in GIAB
Position domain integrity in the GIAB framework enjoys a key advantage
over that for EPIC, namely, that GIAB’s event probabilities and baseline distribu-
tions are a posteriori rather than a priori. Conditioning on the observed measure-
ments allows GIAB to satisfy the same ¯IR as EPIC but with tighter margins. This
subsection develops a PDI strategy for GIAB based on the posterior baseline distri-
butions derived previously.
It is important to understand the subtle distinctions in the probabilities of
incorrect fix under various conditions. If GIAB’s results were only deemed critical
in an average sense, then protection based on the a priori probability of failure
would be sufficient. This is the probability PF = P (F ) = P (zˇ1:q 6= z1:q, q > 0) of
validating any incorrect ambiguity. GIAB manages PF by design, since its aperture
vector β is chosen to satisfy PF ≤ P¯F ,
But safety-of-life systems are concerned not only with average behavior but
also with each estimation epoch’s potential for dangerously large errors. Employ-
ing a measurement-conditioned distribution allows a clearer assessment of the risk
at each epoch. Thus, one might wish to make the posterior distribution in (3.33)
the basis for PDI monitoring. But this distribution is conditioned on the event Zi,
requiring P (Zi|q = i) = 1 − P (F |q = i) be known for operational use. Consider
P (F |q = i), which can be written
P (F |q = i) = P (F, q = i)
P (F c, q = i) + P (F, q = i)
, i > 0 (3.40)
The first term in the denominator may be recognized as the probability of correctly
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validating the first i ambiguities, or PSi . The other term, P (F, q = i), is the prob-
ability that one or more of i validated ambiguities are incorrect. Since the event
(F, q = i) is a subset of the failure event F , it must have a lower probability; thus
P (F, q = i) = αPF , where 0 < α < 1 for i > 0. Then
P (F |q = i) = αPF
PSi + αPF
≈ αPF
PSi
, i > 0 (3.41)
where the approximation follows from PSi  PF , which is typical for high-integrity
systems. For q = m and a strong model, PSm is very close to unity, so P (F |q = m)
remains close to PF . However, for q = i < m and a strong model, PSi might itself
be quite small, say, less than 10−3, making P (F |q = i) orders of magnitude larger
than PF . In other words, for a strong model, conditioning only on q < m makes
an incorrect fix in the q validated ambiguities appear too likely. This would almost
certainly cause IR > ¯IR, triggering an alert and rendering the solution useless.
A more precise assessment of position integrity in such a situation requires
a different approach, one based on examination of the full a posteriori probabilities
of both the correct fix and a large number of potential incorrect fixes. Denote the
posterior fixing probability as
P (Eζ |ε, i) , P (∆z = ζ|ˇc = ε, q = i) (3.42)
Note that, unlike (3.26), this expression is not conditioned on Zi; i.e., it does not
assume that validated fixes are correct. As argued earlier, under Zi, only two alter-
native fixes need be considered to approximate the conditional baseline distribution
as (3.26). But in operation, one does not know whether Zi holds, and so must con-
sider two alternatives for each ambiguity, assuming at each stage that the preceding
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ambiguities were fixed correctly. Since GIAB’s output zˇ contains r ambiguities, at
least 2r − 1 alternatives must be evaluated, or their probabilities, as determined by
(3.42), bounded rigorously.
It is straightforward to derive an expression for P (Eζ |ε, i). Let {ζk} be an
ordered, indexed set of all members of Zr, with ζ0 , 0. Then by the definition of
conditional probability,
P (Eζk |ε, i) (3.43)
= lim
dε→0
P (ε− dε < ˇc ≤ ε,∆z = ζk|q = i)∑
ζ∈Zr P (ε− dε < ˇc ≤ ε,∆z = ζk|q = i)
Noting that the measured random variable ˇc ∈ Rr and the fixing error ∆z ∈ Zr
are related to the zero-mean random variable c(1:r) , L−11:r,1:r1:r ∼ N(0, D1:r,1:r)
as
c(1:r) , L−11:r,1:r1:r = L−11:r,1:r(zˆ1:r − z1:r)
= L−11:r,1:r(zˆ1:r − (zˇ −∆z))
= L−11:r,1:r(ˇ+ ∆z)
= ˇc + L
−1
1:r,1:r∆z
(3.44)
and noting that the additional conditioning on the event q = i in (3.43) restricts the
support of ˇc, but that this only affects the normalization of the PDF, not its form,
then by recognizing equivalent events, (3.43) can be rewritten as
P (Eζk |ε, i) =
N
(
ε+ L−11:r,1:rζk; 0, D1:r,1:r
)∑
ζ∈Zr N
(
ε+ L−11:r,1:rζ; 0, D1:r,1:r
) (3.45)
=
exp
(
−1
2
∥∥ε+ L−11:r,1:rζk∥∥2D1:r,1:r)∑
ζ∈Zr exp
(
−1
2
∥∥ε+ L−11:r,1:rζ∥∥2D1:r,1:r)
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where ‖x‖2Q , xTQ−1x. Note that (3.45) can be regarded as generalization of
(3.26) to include additional alternative fix candidates.
The final conditional PDF for b¯ under MAP GIAB, but without conditioning
on the correctness of the validated fixes, is a generalization of (3.33) that includes
alternative fixes for more than just the rejected ambiguity, and for each fix, its cor-
responding position domain bias:
fb¯|ˇc,q (ξ|ε, i) =
∑
ζk∈Zr
P (Eζk |ε, i)N
(
ξ; b+ µk, Qbˇi+1
)
(3.46)
Each term in the summation corresponds to the event that one of the infinite possible
alternative fixes is correct, and accounts for the conditional PDI risk given that
event. Each event’s baseline remains normally distributed, but with additional mean
error caused by the integer offset, as in (2.16):
µk = Qbˆ zˆcD
−1
1:r,1:rL
−1
1:r,1:rζk (3.47)
A similar expression for fb¯|ˇc,q (ξ|ε, i) can be obtained for float and MMSE GIAB.
See Appendix D of [9] for details on how to determine which incorrect fixes must be
accounted for in (3.46) and when to truncate the infinite summation in the denom-
inator of (3.45). The maximum required set of size 2r, including the IB solution,
is obtained by considering the nearest two integers for each ambiguity in a branch-
ing tree of alternative solutions. In practice, far fewer than 2r alternatives need be
considered. This represents a significant reduction in computational effort when
compared to EPIC.
To compare the relative computational effort of EPIC and GIAB for equiv-
alent requirements, an implementation of EPIC was developed that included early
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termination of the search once the integrity requirements are met. To further limit
unnecessary computation, the alternative fixes are ordered to roughly minimize
search time by sorting the alternatives by the metric ∆zTL−TD−1L−1∆z. This
metric is strongly correlated with the a priori probability that IB will produce the
associated incorrect fix. The average execution time for EPIC and GIAB was com-
pared for a range of models and integrity requirements. Depending on the number
of alternative fixes considered by EPIC, GIAB showed between an 8× and 64×
speed up over EPIC.
Let s ≤ 2r − 1 be the number of non-negligible alternative fixes considered
and the index 0 represent the chosen fix. The IR can be bounded by the following
expression, with Rk defined by (3.39) and with means defined by (3.47) for MAP
GIAB:
RGIAB = 1−
s∑
k=0
(1−Rk)P (Eζk |ε, i) (3.48)
3.7 Performance Analysis
3.7.1 Protection Levels
Integrity requirements are specified in terms of an integrity risk, ¯IR, that
the baseline estimation error will exceed the AL threshold without warning. ¯IR
is derived from an overall risk requirement, such as probability of loss of aircraft,
and is typically a fixed value for a given system use case. The AL is related to
physical obstacle clearance requirements, which are constant for a particular land
based runway and a given aircraft. However, obstacle clearance margins are not
79
constant when landing on a moving platform, such as an aircraft carrier at sea.
Because the risk of excess error is frequently evaluated against a time-varying AL,
it is useful to determine a protection level PL that bounds the estimation error to
the required level of risk.
PL can be thought of as the minimum AL that could be met by a navigation
system or algorithm for a given value of ¯IR. In terms of statistical hypothesis test-
ing, ¯IR corresponds to the desired confidence level, AL corresponds to the decision
threshold, and PL to a prediction interval. If the risk of excess error is expressed as
a function of AL, then PL can be defined as
PL , min
AL
{
AL
∣∣R (AL) ≤ ¯IR} (3.49)
PL for EPIC or for any version of GIAB can be computed by using a root
solving method to solve (3.49) with R(AL) defined by (3.37) or (3.48), as appro-
priate.
3.7.2 Comparison to EPIC
To demonstrate the performance of GIAB compared to the state-of-the-art
high-integrity algorithm, the performance of EPIC and MAP GIAB will be com-
pared for the measurement models previously examined. MAP GIAB is chosen
because it provides better accuracy than float GIAB and is simpler to analyze than
MMSE GIAB. If MMSE GIAB were used, it would compare even more favorably
with EPIC because MMSE GIAB always produces smaller PL values than MAP
GIAB.
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Because it uses an a priori, model driven approach to validation, EPIC will
always produce the same PL for the same number of integers fixed with a given
measurement model and ¯IR. Conversely, GIAB is a data-driven algorithm for which
PL is a random variable. PL has a finite support because it is driven by |ˇci| ≤ 12 .
PL values produced by EPIC will be compared to the minimum, maximum,
and average PL produced by GIAB for each number of integers fixed, along with
the probability that GIAB will fix that number of integers for each model consid-
ered. As shown in Table 3.2, GIAB is able to provide smaller PL values than EPIC
most of the time. Note that PL computed for U by EPIC is simply the PL of the
float solution with no incorrect fixing bias. The event U for GIAB corresponds
to the case where the measurements are so poor that no integers can be fixed suc-
cessfully. The worst case PL computed for any q > 0 by MAP GIAB, which has
the largest PLs of any of the GIAB implementations, is better than the best PL
computed by EPIC.
GIAB provides lower PLs because it is able to reject and exclude most of
the incorrect fixes that EPIC must protect against. This implies that GIAB will also
provide superior availability of integrity for models similar to those examined in this
paper. It is expected that this will be the case in general because the a posteriori
alternate candidate fix used in GIAB will virtually always be among the candidates
considered a priori by EPIC. This implies that any decrease in PL computed by
EPIC as compared to GIAB will result only when the incorrect fixing bias of the
GIAB alternative fix is the same as the largest incorrect fixing bias considered by
EPIC, which will be a rare event.
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Table 3.1: Integrity performance comparison between EPIC and MAP GIAB. All
distance units are in meters. The left-most column indicates the result from GIAB.
The next column indicates it’s theoretical probability of occurrence [11]. The third
column is the standard deviation of the b¯ under the given GIAB event. For EPIC, the
standard deviations from the previous row applies. The next three columns indicate
the minimum, average and maximum PL produced by GIAB under each event. The
final column is the value of PL produced by EPIC when it fixes the same number
of integers as GIAB.
E PE σ (m) PLmin E [PL] PLmax PLEPIC
U 0.00072 0.310 2.79 2.92 3.35 1.77
S1 0.00043 0.221 1.31 1.32 1.37 2.62
S2 0.00051 0.196 1.63 1.74 2.13 2.61
S3 0.00119 0.138 1.75 1.83 2.09 2.49
S4 0.00090 0.115 1.09 1.16 1.38 3.03
S5 0.00189 0.084 0.99 1.04 1.20 2.91
S6 0.00039 0.081 0.48 0.53 0.69 2.99
S7 0.99393 0.081 0.46 0.46 0.46 2.95
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Table 3.2: Integrity performance comparison between EPIC and MAP GIAB for
a weak model. Columns are the same as the prior table. Even for a weak model,
GIAB usually provides a lower AL than EPIC with superior accuracy. In the case
that GIAB rejects all fixes, the computed PL represents the poor quality of the
measurements.
E PE σ (m) PLmin E [PL] PLmax PLEPIC
U 0.138 0.465 2.60 2.93 3.57 2.03
S1 0.093 0.332 1.54 1.56 1.59 2.86
S2 0.084 0.294 1.51 1.78 2.33 2.86
S3 0.099 0.207 1.68 1.87 2.24 2.91
S4 0.071 0.173 1.05 1.20 1.50 3.26
S5 0.080 0.126 0.97 1.08 1.29 3.14
S6 0.033 0.121 0.57 0.60 0.77 3.31
S7 0.398 0.121 0.54 0.54 0.54 3.33
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Note that PL values computed by GIAB and EPIC do not increase or de-
crease uniformly with the number of validated fixes. For example, the maximum
PL increases from 1.37 m to 2.13 m when transitioning from the first successful fix
to the second successful fix. Recall that PL is driven primarily by the bias between
the most likely fix and the incorrect fixes of non-negligible probability. Because
these biases depend on the relationships among the various integers and the base-
line directions of interest (e.g. vertical error), the biases can change dramatically
from one integer fix to the next.
It is tempting to think that in the case of successfully fixing only two integers
in the example above would be better to only fix one integer because that would
yield a lower protection level. It may in fact be preferable to do so, but only if
the bias induced in the solution by leaving the second integer floating produces
acceptable accuracy performance. That is, the reduction in PL is obtained only
at the expense of a biased solution that degrades average accuracy. The impact to
average accuracy can be seen in the difference between the strength of the central
modes of Float and MAP GIAB in Fig. 3.3.
3.8 Conclusions
A new data-driven CDGNSS PAR and validation algorithm has been devel-
oped analytically and validated with Monte Carlo simulation. The new algorithm
has advantages over the state-of-the-art in that (1) data-driven methods offer im-
proved availability of integrity over model-driven methods such as EPIC, (2) the in-
tegrity risk due to incorrect fixing is precisely controlled analytically as compared to
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functional approximation methods used with the ratio test and similar integer aper-
ture methods, (3) it correctly accounts for the integrity risk of PAR in the position
domain that existing GIA methods neglect, and (4) it requires less computational
burden than EPIC because it eliminates the search for many alternate fix candidates.
The new algorithm has been shown to provide superior performance to the current
state-of-the-art method for a range of measurement models.
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Chapter 4
Correlation-Aware Integrity Protection for Fault-Free
Federated Triplex Carrier Differential GNSS
Solutions
4.1 Introduction
1 Hardware redundancy is one straight forward approach to satisfying the
strict requirements of safety-of-life applications: the CDGNSS solutions from mul-
tiple rover receivers with separate antennas and independent multipath can be com-
bined to improve availability for a given set of requirements. This chapter’s focus
is on the popular federated triplex architecture, where each of three rover receivers
computes its own solution using a common set of reference measurements. This
is in contrast to an integrated triplex architecture in which measurements from all
rover receivers are processed together to yield a single CDGNSS solution. The
resulting solutions may be combined by averaging or by mid-level voting (MLV),
which selects the median of the three values. MLV is often the preferred approach
since it is more robust than averaging to single solution faults.
1This chapter was based on
1. G. Nathan Green, Martin King, and Todd E. Humphreys. Fault free integrity of mid-level
voting for triplex differential GPS solutions. In Proceedings of the ION GNSS+ Meeting,
Tampa, FL, 2015.
The author contributed all derivation, simulation, and analysis in that paper and in this chapter.
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MLV architectures are commonly used and well understood for components
that are corrupted by independent errors [20]. But when subsystem outputs have
correlated errors, the performance of MLV depends on the degree of correlation.
Because the three CDGNSS solutions use common reference receivers, they will be
correlated due to common reference receiver noise and multipath. Additional cor-
relations arise from common atmospheric errors and common survey errors. If the
three solutions are treated as independent, then the IR will be computed optimisti-
cally, exposing the system to unacceptable risk. If the three solutions are assumed
to be perfectly correlated; i.e., no integrity credit is taken in the fault free case for
the fact that there are three solutions, then the potential integrity benefit of MLV
triplex solutions is squandered, reducing availability.
There is a large body of work on validation of CDGNSS solutions [4, 5,
27, 29, 32, 34, 37, 41, 43]. The theory of integer bootstrapping is used to predict
the probability that the correct integer ambiguity is found. The implications of
incorrect ambiguity resolution on IR are accounted for in the Geometry Extra Re-
dundant almost-fixed Solutions (GERAFS) [42] and the Enforced Position-domain
Integrity-risk of Cycle resolution (EPIC) [17, 18] algorithms. Moreover, previous
work has analyzed the risk posed by reference receiver faults [19]. But, to the best
of the authors’ knowledge, there exists no prior work on IR evaluation for federated
triplex CDGNSS with full treatment of correlation for multiple rover receivers.
This chapter makes three contributions to account for the integrity implica-
tions of MLV for CDGNSS solutions. First, expressions are obtained for MLV algo-
rithm IR for arbitrarily distributed and for Gaussian distributed solutions. Second,
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this theory is applied to float solutions, fixed solutions, and almost-fixed solutions.
Third, the performance improvements provided by MLV for each type of solution
are described theoretically and demonstrated via a world-wide covariance simula-
tion. Results of the simulation indicate that MLV provides significant integrity and
accuracy improvements for triplex float solutions when compared to simplex float
solutions.
4.2 Fault-Free Integrity for Mid-Level Voting with Arbitrary
Distributions
4.2.1 Integrity Specification Parameters
A few preliminary definitions are needed before MLV can be evaluated.
First, IR is defined as the probability that the error in the relative navigation solution
exceeds a threshold, called an alert limit (AL), without a warning. The algorithms
considered in this chapter monitor IR for fault free performance a priori based on
models that have been validated to bound the errors in the actual system [7]. Since
these monitors operate a priori, they are deterministic values for a given satellite
geometry, hardware configuration, measurement set, and carrier phase track dura-
tion.
Stated symbolically, IR = P
(
(|| ≥ AL) ∧ W¯), where  is the solution er-
ror, and W¯ is the event that no warning is given. If there exists a function of the
measurement models Rmon such that Rmon ≥ P (|| ≥ AL), then a warning can be
given when Rmon ≥ IRspec, where IRspec is a specified tolerable level of IR. Given
such a monitor, IR ≤ IRspec.
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4.2.2 Derivation of MLV Integrity Risk
Consider a random vector X = [X1, X2, X3]
T of three distinct estimates
of a scalar parameter, x. Let X be corrupted by errors  with any well defined
joint probability density function, f (ε). The notation X(i) indicates the ith order
statistic ofX , sorted from least to greatest.
The use of a MLV algorithm ensures that the final estimate of x is X(2) with
error (2) = X(2) − x. To protect the integrity of the navigation solution, a monitor
function is needed such that
Rmon ≥ RMLV = P
(∣∣(2)∣∣ ≥ AL) (4.1)
The probability can be recast in terms of the original random variables by
recognizing that
RMLV = P
(
(2) ≥ AL
)
+ P
(
(2) ≤ −AL
)
(4.2)
and that (2) ≥ AL if any two or more of i ≥ AL. Define Aj as the event that
the two estimates other than Xj have large positive errors, with no constraint on the
errors in Xj . Bj is the similar event, but with large negative errors.
Aj = {i ≥ AL, k ≥ AL} (4.3a)
Bj = {i ≤ AL, k ≤ AL} (4.3b)
with i, j, k distinct elements of {1, 2, 3}.
89
The event that the MLV estimate has a large positive error is the union of
the events Aj: {
(2) ≥ AL
}
= ∪3j=1 {i ≥ AL, k ≥ AL}
= ∪3j=1 (Aj)
(4.4)
Substituting (4.4) into (4.2) with similar logic for Bj , and recognizing that Aj ∩
Bj = ∅:
RMLV =P
(∪3j=1Aj)+ P (∪3j=1Bj)
=
3∑
j=1
[P (Aj)− P (Ai ∩ Ak)] + P
(∩3j=1Aj)
+
3∑
j=1
[P (Bj)− P (Bi ∩Bk)] + P
(∩3j=1Bj)
(4.5)
For the events Aj , the intersections of any two or more such events are
equivalent, i.e.
∩3j=1Aj = Ai ∩ Aj = Ai ∩ Ak = Ak ∩ Aj
= {i ≥ AL, j ≥ AL, k ≥ AL}
(4.6)
Substituting (4.6) into (4.5), with similar logic for Bj , and collecting like terms
yields:
RMLV =
3∑
j=1
[P (Aj) + P (Bj)]
− 2P (∩3j=1Aj)− 2P (∩3j=1Bj)
(4.7)
If  has probability density function f (ε), RMLV is defined by integrals
over the appropriate volumes.
RMLV =
3∑
j=1
[∫∫∫
Vj
f (ε) dε
]
− 2
∫∫∫
Vint
f (ε) dε (4.8)
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with volumes defined as
Vj , Aj ∪Bj = {|i| ≥ AL, |k| ≥ AL}
Vint ,
(∩3j=1Aj) ∪ (∩3j=1Bj)
= {  AL · 1} ∪ {  −AL · 1}
where  and  are vector inequalities and 1 is a vector of all ones.
Equation (4.3) shows that the individual events Aj and Bj do not depend
on the value of j , so the MLV risk integrals can be carried out on the marginal
distributions for the Vj regions.
RMLV =
3∑
j=1
∫∫ ∞
AL
fi,k (εi, εk)dεidεk
+
3∑
j=1
∫∫ −AL
−∞
fi,k (εi, εk)dεidεk
− 2
∞∫∫∫
AL
f (ε) dε− 2
−AL∫∫∫
−∞
f (ε) dε
(4.9)
In the case that the underlying random variables are iid zero-mean Gaussian,
the above risk is greatly simplified by factoring the joint distributions into their
independent parts and expressing the result in terms of the PDF of the standard
normal distribution, φ (·). Let σ be the standard deviation of j:
RMLV = 3

 −
AL
σ∫
−∞
φ (ζ) dζ

2
+
 ∞∫
AL
σ
φ (ζ) dζ

2

− 2

 −
AL
σ∫
−∞
φ (ζ) dζ

3
+
 ∞∫
AL
σ
φ (ζ) dζ

3

(4.10)
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Define the simplex risk as
Rsimplex ,
−AL
σ∫
−∞
φ (ζ) dζ +
∞∫
AL
σ
φ (ζ) dζ = 2
∞∫
AL
σ
φ (ζ) dζ (4.11)
Substituting (4.11) into (4.10) yields
RMLV =3
[(
Rsimplex
2
)2
+
(
Rsimplex
2
)2]
− 2
[(
Rsimplex
2
)3
+
(
Rsimplex
2
)3]
=
3
2
R2simplex
(
1− Rsimplex
3
)
≈3
2
R2simplex
(4.12)
Alternatively, if the solutions are completely correlated Gaussian random
variables with equal variance, then the conditional distributions are degenerate, and
the multiple integrals over the joint distributions reduce to single integrals over a
single variable:
RMLV = 3
 −
AL
σ∫
−∞
φ (ζ) dζ +
∞∫
AL
σ
φ (ζ) dζ

− 2
 −
AL
σ∫
−∞
φ (ζ) dζ +
∞∫
AL
σ
φ (ζ) dζ

= Rsimplex
(4.13)
This implies that perfectly correlated solutions yield the same IR as a simplex so-
lution of the same quality. It is important to note that the actual IR will vary as a
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Figure 4.1: The risk of excess error for a MLV solution is a function of the corre-
lations among the three solutions. When the solutions are fully correlated, the risk
is equivalent to that of a simplex solution. When the solutions are independent, the
risk is greatly reduced. The example of partially correlated errors shown is for a
correlation coefficient ρ = 0.5 between each pair among the three solutions.
function of the degree of correlation among the three solutions. The actual risk is
bounded below by equation (4.12) and bounded above by equation (4.13). The im-
portance of accounting for the correlations among solutions when computing MLV
IR is illustrated in Fig. 4.1. The partially correlated result plotted has correlation
coefficients of 0.5 among the three solutions, which have equal variance. If par-
tially correlated solutions are treated as fully correlated, then the result is overly
conservative, and availability will degrade. If the solutions are incorrectly assumed
to be independent, then IR is not being bounded correctly.
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4.3 Correlation Agnostic Integrity Risk Bound
In the case that there is insufficient knowledge of the correlations to accu-
rately model the joint distribution of the three solutions, a simple a priori bound can
be computed for the selected solution based upon the MLV criteria and the simplex
IRs of the individual solutions without regard for their correlations:
RMLV = P
(∣∣(2)∣∣ > AL)
RMLV ≤ 1− P
(∣∣(1)∣∣ < AL, ∣∣(3)∣∣ < AL) (4.14)
Take Rj = P (|j| > AL). Let i to be the MLV solution in use and j and k to
be the other two solutions. A bound on RMLV can be obtained independent of the
distribution of Xi:
RMLV ≤ 1−
∫ AL
−AL
∫ AL
−AL
fj ,k (ξ, ζ) dζdξ
≤ Rj +Rk
(4.15)
This upper bound for RMLV, which does not depend on the correlation among the
solutions, is derived by in Appendix E.
This demonstrates that even if a single one of the solutions has poor in-
tegrity, it can be assured that the IR from the selected MLV solution can be limited
to the sum of the IRs of the other two solutions. This is of no use when all three
solutions are of similar quality, so it provides little benefit under nominal circum-
stances for fault free integrity. The bound can, however, be used to protect the
integrity of the selected MLV solution in the presence of a single latent fault or a
single large IR.
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4.4 Application of Mid-Level Voting to Carrier Phase Differen-
tial GNSS Solutions
To apply the analytical tools developed in Section 4.2 to triplex CDGNSS
solutions, the joint distributions of the three solutions must be derived for all so-
lutions of interest. This chapter will examine the float solution, the fixed solution,
and the GERAFS algorithm [42]. The EPIC algorithm [18] is not evaluated. As
will be shown, it is not appropriate to consider the joint probabilities of ambiguity
resolution among the federated solutions.
4.4.1 Simplex Float Solution Joint Distribution
Each individual float solution is formed by solving the linearized, least
squares, double-difference relative baseline solution. The solution is formed by
linearizing the measurement model about an initial estimate of the baseline vector,
b¯. The measurements comprise a set of carrier phase observables and some prior
information, such as pseudoranges or geometry free estimates of the integer am-
biguities. To form a weighted least squares solution, the joint covariance of the
measurements and the prior information must be known. For the case that the prior
information is a set of smoothed pseudoranges, the linearized measurement model
for the ith federated solution is
yi =
 Gi Λi
Gi 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Hi
 δb
ai

︸ ︷︷ ︸
xi
+εi (4.16)
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with
εi ∼ N (0,Σi)
Σi: Measurement covariance matrix
Gi =

(
u1i − uli
)T
...(
umii − uli
)T

uki : unit vector from space vehicle (SV) k to receiver i
l: key SV used in double differences
mi: number of double differences
Λ = Diag
(
λ1 · · · λmi
)
wavelength matrix
Each float solution is computed and the solution matrix, Si, is retained for
later use:
xˆi =
δbˆi
aˆi
 = (HTi Σ−1i Hi)−1HiTΣ−1i yi = Siyi
bˆi = b¯+ δbˆi : Final baseline estimate
(4.17)
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4.4.2 Triplex Float Solution Joint Distribution
Each of these float solution matrices is combined with the total system joint
measurement covariance to form the total solution covariance:
Σfloat,triplex = cov
([
bˆ1 aˆ1 bˆ2 aˆ2 bˆ3 aˆ3
]T)
=

S1 0 0
0 S2 0
0 0 S3


Σy,1 Σ
T
y,2,1 Σ
T
y,3,1
Σy,2,1 Σy,2 Σ
T
y,3,2
Σy,3,1 Σy,3,2 Σy,3


S1 0 0
0 S2 0
0 0 S3

T
=

S1Σy,1S
T
1 S1Σ
T
y,2,1S
T
2 S1Σ
T
y,3,1S
T
3
S2Σy,2,1S
T
1 S2Σy,2S
T
2 S2Σ
T
y,3,2S
T
3
S3Σy,3,1S
T
1 S3Σy,3,2S
T
2 S3Σy,3S
T
3

(4.18)
The off-block-diagonal terms of the measurement covariance matrix are populated
by reference receiver errors, atmospheric errors, and lever arm errors used to trans-
lated the three solutions to a common reference point. The resulting triplex co-
variance can be broken down into several pieces: covariance among the various
baseline estimates
(
Σbibj
)
, among the various real-valued float integer estimates(
ΣNiNj
)
, and among the baseline estimates and the integer estimates (ΣbiNi). This
decomposition of the matrix is denoted as follows, with the elided upper triangular
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portion being the transpose of the lower triangular portion shown:
Σbˆ1
Σaˆ1bˆ1 Σaˆ1
Σbˆ2bˆ1 Σbˆ2aˆ1 Σbˆ2
Σaˆ2bˆ1 Σaˆ2aˆ1 Σaˆ2bˆ2 Σaˆ2
Σbˆ3bˆ1 Σbˆ3aˆ1 Σbˆ3bˆ2 Σbˆ3aˆ2 Σbˆ3
Σaˆ3bˆ1 Σaˆ3aˆ1 Σaˆ3bˆ2 Σaˆ3aˆ2 Σaˆ3bˆ3 Σaˆ3

(4.19)
By extracting the desired components from this overall joint solution covariance
matrix, MLV can be performed on the vertical and lateral components of the relative
baseline solution.
4.4.3 Simplex Fixed Solution Integrity
Many methods exist to fix the integer ambiguities. Among these are integer
rounding [29], integer bootstrap [32], and integer least squares (ILS) [34]. Each al-
gorithm has its advantages and disadvantages. Integer rounding is the simplest, but
it has the lowest probability of correctly fixing the integers. Bootstrap has improved
probability of success and has a convenient way to predict probability of correct fix,
PCF , P (aˇ = a), but this probability is suboptimal and is sensitive to the order
and combination in which ambiguities are resolved. ILS is an optimal method in
terms of PCF , but entails a grid search of the integer space and has no analytical
expression for PCF .
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High integrity CDGNSS systems typically use the bootstrap method to-
gether with the ambiguity decorrelation adjustment of the LAMBDA method. By
using the decorrelated ambiguities, the bootstrap algorithm fixes successive inte-
ger ambiguities in the order of maximum conditional PCF . This set of algorithms
provides high integrity with predictable probability of correct integer fixing.
Due to the nonlinear rounding operation, the fixed baseline solution does
not havea Gaussian distribution. Rather, it is a mixture of multivariate Gaussian
distributions of equal covariance, but differing means [32]. This distribution is
illustrated in Fig. 4.2 and described mathematically in (4.20). Let the accent mark
(ˇ ) denote a quantity conditioned on the fixed integer estimate aˇ.
bˇ = bˆ− ΣbˆaˆΣ−1aˆ (aˆ− aˇ) (4.20a)
Σbˇ = Σbˆ − ΣbˆaˆΣ−1aˆ Σaˆbˆ (4.20b)
bˇ ∼
∑
z∈Zm
P (aˇ = a+ z)N
(
b+ ΣbˆaˆΣ
−1
aˆ z,Σbˇ
)
(4.20c)
The probability P (aˇ = a+ z) is a deterministic function of Σaˆ and the
decorrelating transform used [32]. Conditioned on the event that aˇ = a, the base-
line estimate is once again a zero-mean multivariate Gaussian random vector. The
IR in making this assumption is PIF , 1 − PCF . The covariance of the fixed so-
lution is smaller than the float covariance since the errors are driven by the carrier
phase measurements rather than by the pseudoranges. The IR associated with the
vertical component of a fixed solution is bounded by the following:
Rfixed,V = P
(∣∣bˇV − bV∣∣ > ALV)
≤ PIF + PCFP
(∣∣bˇV − bV∣∣ > ALV|aˇ = a) (4.21)
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Figure 4.2: The positive portion of the modeled PDFs of the fixed, GERAFS, and
EPIC baseline errors. The fixed baseline has a Gaussian mixture distribution with
biases and weights determined by the incorrect fixes. Whereas the EPIC baseline
follows the fixed baseline closely for incorrect fixes of non-negligible probability,
the GERAFS baseline assigns all of the non-negligible probability of incorrect fix
to the fix with the largest incorrect fixing bias.
4.4.4 Triplex Fixed Solution Joint Distribution
The transition from simplex to triplex for the float solution is simply a matter
of extracting the appropriate portions of the system float covariance matrix to form
the baseline covariance, but the fixed triplex solution is more complicated. Consider
the triplex fixed baseline covariance:
ΣBˇ,triplex =

Σbˆ1|aˆ1
Σbˆ2|aˇ2,bˆ1|aˇ1 Σbˆ2|aˇ2
Σbˆ3|aˇ3,bˆ1|N1 Σbˆ3|aˇ3,bˆ2|N2 Σbˆ3|aˇ3
 (4.22)
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Where the off diagonal terms are computed from parts of the system float
covariance and the block diagonal terms are the results of the individual fixed so-
lutions. Take ˇi = (aˆi − aˇi) and assume aˇi = ai. Defining δbˆ , bˆ − b, the off
diagonal blocks can be computed as
Σbˆi|aˇi,bˆj |aˇj = E
[(
bˇi − b
) (
bˇj − b
)T]
=E
[(
δbˆi − ΣbˆiaˆiΣ−1aˆi ˇi
)(
δbˆj − Σbˆj aˆjΣ−1aˆj ˇj
)T]
=E
[
δbˆiδbˆ
T
j
]
+ E
[
ΣbˆiaˆiΣ
−1
aˆi
ˇi
(
Σbˆj aˆjΣ
−1
aˆj
ˇj
)T]
− E
[
δbˆi
(
Σbˆj aˆjΣ
−1
aˆj
ˇj
)T]
− E
[
ΣbˆiaˆiΣ
−1
aˆi
ˇiδbˆ
T
j
]
=Σbˆibˆj + ΣbˆiaˆiΣ
−1
aˆi
ΣaˆiaˆjΣ
−1
aˆj
ΣT
bˆj aˆj
− ΣbˆiaˆjΣ−1aˆj ΣTbˆj aˆj − ΣbˆiaˆiΣ
−1
aˆi
Σaˆibˆj
(4.23)
The integrity of the MLV algorithm for the triplex fixed solutions depends
upon all three of the fixes being correct. Conditioned on this event, the three fixed
baselines are distributed as a single, correlated, zero-mean multivariate Gaussian
random vector. Assuming that any incorrect fix will result in errors exceeding the
AL, the risk of excess error for a fixed triplex solution can be counded as
Rfixed,triplex ≤ 1− P (CF 1 ∩ CF 2 ∩ CF 3)
+ P (CF 1 ∩ CF 2 ∩ CF 3)
×RMLV
(
AL,0,ΣBˇ,triplex
) (4.24)
To upper bound the IR, the probability of correctly fixing all three inte-
ger solutions must be upper bounded. This bound is obtained by assuming that
the events are perfectly correlated; i.e., one correct fix implies that all others are
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correctly fixed, and one incorrect fix implies all others are incorrectly fixed. Ad-
ditionally, the risk that any of the fixes is incorrect must be bounded since 1 −
P (CF 1 ∩ CF 2 ∩ CF 3) = P (IF 1 ∪ IF 2 ∪ IF 3):
P
(⋂
i
CF i
)
= P (CF 1|CF 2,CF 3)P (CF 2|CF 3)P (CF 3)
Perfect correlation⇒ P (CF j|CF k) = 1,∀j, k
∴ P
(⋂
i
CF i
)
≤ min
i
(PCF i)
(4.25)
Also, the probability of a union of events must be less than or equal to the
sum of the probabilities of the events.
P (IF 1 ∪ IF 2 ∪ IF 3) ≤
∑
i
PIF i (4.26)
Substituting equations (4.25) and (4.26) into equation (4.24), the final bound
is obtained.
Rfixed,MLV ≤
∑
i
PIF i
+ min
i
(PCF i)×RMLV
(
AL,0,ΣBˇ,triplex
) (4.27)
It is evident from examining the above expression that this solution is only
available if
∑
i
PIF i < IRspec. This implies that the demands on the probability of
correct fix for triplex MLV are more stringent than for the simplex case. This may
cause the overall system availability to be even lower for a federated triplex fixed
solution than for the simplex solution if the PIF is near the required IR.
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4.4.5 Simplex GERAFS Integrity Risk
If a fixed solution does not produce a sufficiently high probability of correct
fix, then an alternative is to use an “almost-fixing” solution. Almost-fixing solutions
control IR by assessing the risk induced by biases that result from incorrect fixes
near the fixed solution. Two such algorithms are GERAFS and EPIC.
In the almost-fixed case, the fixed baseline has the same underlying multi-
modal mixture distribution as the fixed solution, but the integrity impact of modes
other than the chosen fixed solution is accounted for in the position domain. Both
GERAFS and EPIC examine a set of candidate integer fixes that differ from aˇ by
an integer offset d ∈ ∆ ⊂ Zm \ {0}. The deterministic bias that would result if
aˇ = a + d is computed for all d ∈ ∆. The set of all float ambiguities mapped to
{a+ d|d ∈ ∆} is called the enlarged pull-in region (EPIR).
The GERAFS algorithm addresses the IR by assuming that the bias from
any incorrect fix is equal to the worst case bias induced by any candidate fix. The
magnitude of the worst case bias is called the incorrect fixing bias, IFB . The EPIC
algorithm assesses the IR from each incorrect fix candidate separately, yielding
higher availability than GERAFS. See Fig. 4.2 for an example of the distribution
models used by EPIC and GERAFS compared with the associated fixed baseline
distribution. Given these definitions, and defining
PEPIR ,
∑
d∈∆
P (aˇ = a+ d) (4.28a)
PAF , PCF + PEPIR (4.28b)
PNAF , 1− PAF (4.28c)
103
the risk of excess error for a simplex GERAFS solution is bounded
RGERAFS,V = P (|bV − bV| > ALV)
≤ PNAF + PCFP (|bV − bV| > ALV|N = aˇ)
+ PEPIRP (|bV − bV| > ALV|N ∈ EPIR)
(4.29)
4.4.6 Triplex GERAFS Joint Distribution
When conditioned an a particular candidate ambiguity, the covariance of an
almost-fixed solution is the same as that of a fixed solution, so all that remains is
to assess the integrity ramifications of almost-fixing. The development is similar
to the fixed case with PAF often taking the role of PCF for the fixed case. The
MLV integrity monitor must also be modified to reflect the worst case biases in the
positive and negative directions. The modified risk monitoring function is denoted
as R¯MLV :
R¯MLV =
∑
j
∞∫∫
AL−IFB
fi1 ,i2 (εi1 , εi2)dεi1dεi2
+
∑
j
IFB−AL∫∫
−∞
fi1 ,i2 (εi1 , εi2)dεi1dεi2
− 2
∞∫∫∫
AL−IFB
f (ε) dε− 2
IFB−AL∫∫∫
−∞
f (ε) dε
(4.30)
Where the IFB in the integral limits is the worst case incorrect fixing bias for the
variable of integration.
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This is identical to the previous definition of MLV integrity except that the
magnitudes of the means are applied in the direction that maximizes risk. That is,
IFB is added when evaluated against positive errors and subtracted when evaluated
against negative errors. This ensures conservatism in the integrity bound:
RGERAFS,MLV,V ≤
∑
i
PNAF i
+ min
i
(PCF i)×RMLV
(
AL,ΣBˇV ,triplex
)
+
mini (PEPIRi)× R¯MLV,GERAFS (AL, IFB ,ΣBˇV ,triplex)

(4.31)
4.5 Analytical Comparison to Simplex Solutions
The important metrics to be considered when comparing the simplex and
triplex solutions are daily average accuracy and availability of integrity. Daily av-
erage accuracy is assessed for each location in a global grid and averaged over 24
hours at 5 minute intervals. Availability of integrity is the percentage of time that a
particular system can meet the specified integrity requirements in operation. The IR
equations for each type of solution provide the basis for making these assessments.
For the float solution, the MLV risk is simply a set of integrals with no
risk due to integer fixing. Because of this there is no automatic integrity penalty for
assuming that the integer ambiguities have been correctly resolved. Equations (4.9),
(4.12), and (4.13) demonstrate that availability of integrity for triplex MLV float
solutions can only be better than that of the simplex solution, unless the solutions
are completely correlated.
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The accuracy of the MLV float solution can be computed for the (1− α)
percentile by numerically solving:
εα = inf
{
ε|RMLV
(
ε,ΣBˇ,triplex
) ≤ α} (4.32)
By the same logic applied to availability of integrity, the MLV equation demon-
strates that the accuracy of federated triplex float solutions will be better than the
accuracy of the simplex float solutions. Depending on the specified IR and ALs,
MLV may provide sufficient performance improvement so that a triplex float solu-
tion would satisfy the requirements when a simplex float solution would not.
For the federated triplex fixed solution, MLV is not usually advantageous.
Typically, the IR for a fixed solution is limited by PIF , not by the accuracy of the
fixed solution. Examination of equation (4.24) shows that all three solutions are
required to have simultaneously correct fixes. This divides the individual required
PIF requirement by three. If a fixed solution is unavailable, or marginally available
for the simplex case, it is less available for virtually all conditions in the federated
triplex case.
For GERAFS solutions with the IR and AL requirements considered in this
chapter, MLV provides no integrity benefit. The reduced allocation of PNAF re-
quired for the MLV solution increases the IFB so that the MLV GERAFS solu-
tion is less available than the simplex GERAFS solution. To gain the most benefit
possible from the triplex architecture, each GERAFS solution will protect its own
integrity risk, and then MLV will be used to improve the accuracy performance of
the final result.
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4.6 Simulation Methodology
A numerical covariance analysis tool was used to assess the performance
of the federated triplex GERAFS solutions as compared to the simplex GERAFS
solution. This tool is an updated version of the same availability model (AM) that
was originally used to assess the availability of the GERAFS algorithm [42]. The
model was updated to include the MLV solution and a more stringent integrity re-
quirement to reflect the needs of unmanned air vehicles. All solutions are computed
using the wide lane carrier phase and narrow lane code combination.
For each location, availability of accuracy is zero if the daily average ac-
curacy at that location is worse than the requirement. Availability of integrity is
assessed for each time step, at each location. The AM evaluates algorithm perfor-
mance on a worldwide grid of latitude and longitude and at 5 minute intervals over
a 24 hour period.
Because integrity requirements must be satisfied at all times without the
benefit of averaging, there are 288 × NGridPoints assessments of availability of in-
tegrity. Alternatively, accuracy is a daily average for each location, so there are
only NGridPoints assessments of availability of accuracy. Let T be the set of times
considered by the simulation. Each worldwide grid point is given an availability
value defined as follows with world wide availability computed as the average over
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all grid points:
AGP =

|{t∈T|IRGP(t)<IRspec}|
|T| εavg ≤ εspec
0 εavg > εspec
(4.33)
where |{·}| is the number of elements in the set.
The error models used for the simulation include thermal noise, multipath,
and antenna bias model for carrier phase and pseudorange, lever arm translation
errors, and propagation effects due to latency of reference receiver data. Both sim-
plex and triplex GERAFS implementations use a float solution as a backup when
the PCF and PAF requirements are not satisfied. This allows for graceful degra-
dation of system average accuracy as the GERAFS algorithm is unable to fix with
integrity.
4.7 Simulation Results
The results of the original simplex GERAFS algorithm in [42] have been
reproduced for an IR requirement reduced to reflect the needs of an unmanned
landing. The results show the availability of the solutions as a function of the spec-
ified accuracy for varying ALs. There is a trend for all solutions that availability
decreases with the AL. The simplex GERAFS and triplex GERAFS solutions also
have decreasing accuracy as the AL decreases. This trend results from the less ac-
curate float solution being used when GERAFS is unable to satisfy the required IR
for the given AL.
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For the least restrictive AL, the simplex GERAFS solution is almost always
able to operate in the almost-fixed mode. However, as the AL is reduced, the IFB
computed by GERAFS exceeds the AL more frequently, resulting in the use of the
backup float solution. The direct results of the reduced AL are degraded average
accuracy and reduced availability of integrity. For the specified IR used in these
simulations, GERAFS is usually unavailable for an AL of 1.5 m, and the backup
float solution is used. As a result, for this combination of requirements, simplex
GERAFS performance is roughly equivalent to simplex float performance.
Table 4.1: World-wide availability for varying ALs for each solution
Solution Type\AL 1.5 m 2.5 m 3.5 m 4.4 m
Float .8239 .9977 .9999 .9999
Simplex GERAFS .8117 .9929 .9984 .9990
Triplex .9629 .9995 .9999 .9999
For the triplex GERAFS solution, the probability of any of the three fixes
being incorrect is lower bounded by the sum of the probabilities that each is in-
correct. For the fixed solution to be used in these simulations, the PCF is required
to be greater than .998. This implies that the 95% accuracy of the MLV GERAFS
solution will be as accurate as the simplex GERAFS solution or better.
4.8 Conclusions
Federated triplex solutions offer significant benefits to improve accuracy
and integrity of float solutions, but for likely levels of IR and ALs the additional
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Table 4.2: Daily average 70% accuracy for each solution at 99.5% availability or
maximum obtained
Solution Type\AL 1.5 m 2.5 m 3.5 m 4.4 m
Float 32.7 cm 35.6 cm 36.0 cm 36.0 cm
Simplex GERAFS 32.7 cm 28.6 cm 21.9 cm 20.1 cm
Triplex 24.7 cm 20.6 cm 16.0 cm 14.6 cm
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Figure 4.3: Comparison of availability vs. accuracy for float, GERAFS, and MLV
triplex solutions for varying AL. As the AL is reduced, the GERAFS algorithm
is less frequently able to fix the integer ambiguities. When the fixed solution is
unavailable, both the GERAFS and MLV triplex solutions use a float solution as
a backup. The performance of the GERAFS solution degrades to that of the float
solution when AL = 1.5m since the fixed solution is completely unavailable. Even
when the MLV triplex solution uses the float solution, the integrity and accuracy
benefits of MLV enable a 15% increase in availability and an 8 cm improvement in
70% accuracy.
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burden of correctly fixing all three sets of integers prevents performance improve-
ment for fixed or almost-fixed solutions. The degree of improvement afforded by
federated triplex float solutions makes them competitive with simplex GERAFS so-
lutions. Unfortunately, this solution requires three active rover receivers at all times
which would require even more receivers to be used to ensure system continuity.
MLV for the GERAFS algorithm still provides improved accuracy even when no
additional integrity credit is claimed. To alleviate the continuity risk and enhance
integrity, future studies will examine integrated architecture alternatives which will
provide performance improvements with fewer rover receivers.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Summary
The ability to reliably us fixed-integer CDGNSS positioning in safety-of-
life applications will open up new horizons in autonomous vehicle navigation.
Centimeter-accurate position estimates with sub-meter error integrity assurance will
allow for unmanned air vehicles to land and refuel reliably during daily operation.
Autonomous cars and advanced driver assistance features will be able to track the
lane position of the vehicle with respect to curated maps which were themselves
created with integrity assurance. Such remarkable feats will only be possible if the
integer estimates can be trusted. This dissertation defends the following thesis:
Integer-fixed CDGNSS positioning for demanding safety-of-life applica-
tions requires a novel data-driven integer ambiguity validation method which ben-
efits further from mid-level voting triplex architectures.
The following section offers a summary of the contributions proving this
thesis statement.
• Chapter 2 presents the derivation and validation of the Generalized Integer
Aperture Bootstrapping (GIAB) algorithm that validates the correctness of
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the integer ambiguities with provable integrity, including for partial ambigu-
ity resolution. The performance of the algorithm was validated via Monte
Carlo simulation. GIAB was shown to be nearly as effective as the optimal
IA method, while providing integrity sufficient for safety-of-life applications.
• Chapter 3 further extends the GIAB algorithm to provide position-domain
integrity protection. This is particularly important for the case of partial am-
biguity resolution, because it was proven in chapter 3 that the posterior PDF
of a data-driven, partially-fixed baseline estimate is biased away from the true
baseline even when constrained only using correctly validated fixes. The de-
rived PDFs were validated with Monte Carlo simulations. The performance
of the algorithm was shown to exceed that of the EPIC algorithm.
• Chapter 4 describes how MLV-triplex CDGNSS architectures can be used
to improve the accuracy and integrity performance of positioning. Integrity
monitors for float, fixed, and GERAFS solutions are developed. MLV-triplex
float CDGNSS solutions benefit significantly both in terms of integrity and
accuracy performance for the fault-free case. Fixed and GERAFS solutions
benefit in fault-free accuracy performance, but receive no benefit in fault-free
integrity benefit from a MLV-triplex architecture.
5.2 Future Work
Future work will include analysis of real-world CDGNSS data using GIAB
and integration of GIAB into a complete safety-of-life navigation system.
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Appendix A
CDGNSS Measurement Model
A.1 GNSS Measurement Model
GNSS receivers provide two types of measurements for each signal that
they track. The first measurement is called a pseudorange. A pseudorange is a
noisy, biased estimate of the geometric range between the receiver antenna and
the satellite antenna. The measurement is corrupted by a number of error sources
including atmospheric delays, thermal noise, and multipath interference. The total
effect of these errors for a single pseudorange measurement is typically on the order
of 10s of meters.
The second type of GNSS measurement is called the carrier phase. The
carrier phase provides an estimate of the change in the distance between the re-
ceiver antenna and the satellite antenna. Because the carrier phase only estimates
the change in distance, it is ambiguous with respect to the full geometric range
between the satellite and receiver antennas. However, it is a much smoother mea-
surement than the pseudorange, with noise on the order of a few millimeters. It
is also corrupted by atmospheric delays, similar to those of the pseudorange. The
subsequent subsections will develop a model for these measurements as they are
used with CDGNSS systems over short baselines, of a few kilometers.
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A.1.1 Undifferenced Measurement Model
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Figure A.1: An illustration of the geometric relationships among two GNSS satel-
lites and two GNSS receivers. A CDGNSS system is interested in computing the
relative position vector, or baseline, between the two receivers. This baseline is de-
noted b. The vectors with subscripts, e.g. ri, indicate receiver positions, and those
vectors with superscripts, e.g. rk, indicate satellite positions. Vectors with both
super- and subscripts, e.g. rki , indicate relative position vectors from satellites to
receivers.
The pseudorange measurement can be modeled as the sum of the geometric
range between the satellite and receiver, (rki ), and several error terms. Refer to
figure A.1 for an illustration of the vectors used in this section. The error terms
include the effect of clock errors at the receiver cδtRi and at the satellite (cδt
j
S),
ionospheric group delay (Iki ), tropospheric delay (T
k
i ), and a lumped error term
that includes both white noise and time-correlated multipath errors (wkρi).
ρki = r
k
i + c(δtRi − δtkS) + Ikρi + T ki + wkρi (A.1)
For a single pseudorange measurement, the total error from all of these
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sources is typically between 5 m and 50 m [23]. Most of the error comes from the
ionospheric and tropospheric delay. The receiver clock error is solved for directly
in the navigation solution since it is only a single unknown. The satellite clock error
is corrected using a broadcast model with residual errors of approximately 2 m.
As GNSS signals pass through the ionosphere, they are delayed by the
equivalent of between 2 m and 10 m for satellites at zenith. This delay is in-
creased as the satellite elevation decreases toward the horizon, i.e. as the signal
passes through more of the atmosphere. For very low elevation angles, the delay
inceases by a factor of 3. By using the broadcast ionospheric correction model,
approximately 60% of the ionospheric delay can be corrected [8]. Because the
ionosphere is a dispersive medium, i.e. it induces a frequency dependent group
delay, dual-frequency GNSS receivers can estimate the delay with uncertainty of
approximately 1 m.
The troposphere causes a similar delay of approximately 2.5 m at zenith
[21]. Because the troposphere is much thicker in extend than the ionosphere, low
elevation satellites suffer a delay increase of a factor of 10 over those at zenith.
By using models that reflect average meteorological conditions, these effects can
compensated to an uncertainty of 0.1 m to 1 m at zenith. The troposphere is a non-
dispersive medium, so dual-frequency measurements are not useful for estimating
the tropospheric delay.
The multipath error depends on the radio frequency (RF) environment near
the antennas. In “clean” multipath environments with few reflective surfaces, multi-
path errors on the pseudorange are about a meter in magnitude. In more challenging
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environments, mulipath errors can be as large as 30 m to 150 m, depending on re-
ceiver architecture. Thermal noise is a much smaller contributor than multipath,
typically less than half a meter.
There is a similar measurement model for the carrier phase:
λ · φki = rki + c(δtRi − δtkS) + λ(γk0i − ψk0) + Ijφk + T ki + λ · wkφi (A.2)
In this equation, the carrier phase error is actually equal and opposite to the
pseudorange error. That is:
Iki = I
k
ρi
= −Ikφi (A.3)
Also, the term λ(γk0i − ψk0) models the initial carrier phase offset of the receiver as
it acquires the kth satellite signal
(
γk0i
)
, and the unknown initial phase of the trans-
mitted signal at the satellite
(
ψk0
)
. The carrier phase noise
(
wkφi
)
is typically a small
fraction of carrier phase cycle, which results in a range error of a few millimeters.
This error is much smaller than that of the pseudorange noise and mulitpath, but the
carrier phase is ambiguous since it only tracks the change in range from the time
that phase lock was established.
A.1.2 Short Baseline Single Differences Measurement Model
When a pair of receivers is being used, it is common to form an observable
by differencing the pseudoranges and carrier phases from the two receivers to each
satellite that is tracked by both receivers. This forms the so called between receiver
single difference (BRSD) observable. Since atmospheric errors are spatially corre-
lated, much of the ionospheric and tropospheric errors cancel out leaving a much
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smaller residual error. Also, the SV clock bias cancels out completely. The nota-
tion used to indicate a the difference between two measurement model terms for the
same satellite and different receivers is
(·)kij = (·)ki − (·)kj , i : Rover (Air) Receiver, j: Reference (Ship) Receiver (A.4)
Applying this notation to the pseudorange and carrier phase measurement
equations (A.1) and (A.2), the BRSD measurement model are
ρkij = r
k
ij + I
k
ij + T
k
ij + w
k
ρij
+ bij (A.5a)
λφkij = r
k
ij − Ikij + T kij + λγk0ij + wkφij + bij (A.5b)
The ionospheric and tropospheric delays for receivers that are a few kilo-
meters apart are highly correlated. This causes the residual atmospheric delay in
the BRSD measurement to be significantly reduced. For such short baselines, the
residual tropospheric delay drops from roughly 2.4 m to about 0.2 m. Similarly, the
ionospheric error can be reduced to 0.2 m for even longer baselines in the absence
of heightened solar activity. The remaining errors are not correlated between re-
ceivers, so receiver clock biases, multipath, and thermal noise errors are combined.
A.1.3 Double Difference Measurement Model
By differencing BRSDs from two satellites, a double difference measure-
ment is formed with several attractive properties. All clock biases are eliminated
and all atmospheric errors are reduced to residuals. The dominant error terms are
the code and carrier multipath. Furthermore, the remaining phase uncertainty is
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now integer valued, which will allow for the use of the integer ambiguity resolu-
tion techniques which enable precision relative GNSS solutions. The measurement
model is
ρklij = r
kl
ij + I
kl
ij + T
kl
ij + w
kl
ρij
(A.6a)
λφklij = r
kl
ij − Iklij + T klij + λγkl0ij + wklφij (A.6b)
γkl0ij ∈ Z (A.6c)
A.1.4 Carrier Phase Smoothed Pseudorange Measurements
Recall that the noise and multipath that corrupt the pseudorange measure-
ments can be several meters in magnitude, but the same type of errors in the carrier
phase measurements are on the order of a centimeter. Unfortunately, the carrier
phase is ambiguous, so it cannot simply be used in place of the pseudorange mea-
surement to directly solve for the position of a receiver without prior information.
To gain some benefit from the carrier phase measurements, the pseudorange ob-
servables can be smoothed using the carrier phase observables. The resultant value
is called the carrier smoothed code (CSC) measurement. The CSC has less noise
than the raw pseudorange, but the temporal correlation of the multipath reduces
the effectiveness of the smoothing. Further, since the ionospheric effect delays the
pseudorange and advances the carrier phase measurement, over time, the code and
carrier measurements diverge from each other. This effect is called code carrier di-
vergence (CCD). Because the ionosphere is a dispersive medium, the delay/advance
is related to the frequency of the carrier signal. When L1 and L2 measurements
are available, the CCD effect can be mitigated by dual-frequency divergence free
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smoothing (DFS) [22].
Low-Pass Filter
G
1-G
ρ[k]
+
+
+
–λφ[k]
Z-1
+
+
 k
Figure A.2: A block diagram of the low pass filter form of the carrier smoothed
code observable. In this approach, the difference between the carrier phase and
the pseudorange is smoothed with a low pass filter with a time-varying gain. This
difference is then added back to the carrier phase to form a smoothed estimate of
the pseudorange.
One popular form of CSC smoothing is to use a low pass filter (LPF) with a
time varying gain to smooth the difference between the pseudorange and the carrier
phase measurements. This smoothed difference is then added back to the already
low noise carrier phase to yield a smoothed pseudorange estimate. Denoting the
CSC after k uninterrupted measurements as ρ¯ [k], this can be expressed as
ρ¯ [k] = (1−G [k]) (ρ¯ [k − 1]− λφ [k − 1])+G [k] (ρ [k]− λφ [k])+λφ [k] (A.7)
With the gain is defined as
G [k] =
{
1
k
k ≤ kmax
1
kmax
k > kmax
, (A.8)
This is how the smoother is computed practically, but to analyze the performance
of the filter, it is useful to develop a closed form, non-iterative expression for ρ¯ [k].
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For k < kmax, the CSC expression simplifies to the sum of the current phase
and the time average of the code-minus-carrier:
ρ¯ [k] = λφ [k] +
1
k
k∑
j=1
(ρ [k]− λφ [k]) , ∀1 ≤ k ≤ kmax (A.9)
For k > kmax, the time average is replaced by a constant gain LPF, and the resulting
equation is a bit more complex.
ρ¯ [k] =λφ [k] +Kk−kmax (ρ¯ [kmax]− λφ [kmax])
+
1
kmax
k∑
j=kmax+1
Kk−j (ρ [k]− λφ [k]) ,∀k > kmax
(A.10)
with K = 1 − 1
kmax
. In either case, the CSC is equal to the current carrier phase
plus a weighted average of all previous carrier-minus-code observables. When this
smoothing is applied to the measurement models in equations A.1 and A.2, a model
for the CSC is obtained. The time index will be changed to n below to avoid con-
fusion with the satellite index.
λφki [n]− ρ¯ki [n] = λ
(
γk0i + ψ
k
0
)− (2I¯ki + w¯kρ,i − λw¯kφ,i) (A.11a)
ρ¯ki [n] = r
k
i + c(δtRi − δtkS) +
(
I¯ki + w¯
k
ρ,i − λw¯kφ,i
)
+ T ki + λ · wkφi (A.11b)
This expression implies that the difference between the carrier phase and the
CSC comprises the carrier phase ambiguity, double the time averaged ionospheric
delay, the time averaged pseudorange noise and multipath, and the time averaged
carrier phase noise and multipath. If these observables are being used in a double
difference in which the smoothing filters in the two receivers use different values
of kmax or have smoothed different numbers of measurements, the time averaging
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of the ionospheric delay causes the BRSD ionospheric residuals to be significantly
larger than otherwise expected. This effect can be mitigated by dual-frequency
divergence-free smoothing.
A.1.5 Divergence-Free Smoothing
Because the ionosphere is a dispersive medium for GNSS frequencies, the
ionospheric delay is well approximated by an inverse-square law [23].
I ≈ 40.3TEC
f 2
(A.12)
By carefully combining measurements from both L1 and L2 pseudoranges and car-
rier phases, the ionospheric contribution of the code-minus-carrier observable can
be removed prior to smoothing. This preserves the correlation between the iono-
spheric delay experienced by a rover and a reference receiver when using double
difference or BRSD measurements.
For full details of the derivation of the constants used in divergence-free
smoothing, the reader is referred to [22]. The key results are presented here. The
four parameters, α1, α2, β1, and β2, are determined from the inverse square law and
the constraints that α1 +α2 = 1 and β1 +β2 = 1 so that the geometric range compo-
nent is preserved. Also, the ionospheric error component from the combination of
carrier phase must cancel out the ionospheric error in the pseudorange combination.
This ensures that no contribution from the ionospheric error is provided as input to
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Figure A.3: Divergence-free smoothing is accomplished by weighting the input
pseudoranges and carrier phases such that the ionospheric delay in the pseudor-
ange is canceled by the carrier phase used in the smoother. In this way, reference
and rover receivers are able to independently smooth their pseudoranges without
decorrelating the ionospheric delay.
the LPF. For an arbitrary choice of α1, the parameters are
α2 = 1− α1 (A.13a)
β1 =
2f 21
f 21 − f 22
− α1 (A.13b)
β2 = α1 − f
2
1 + f
2
2
f 21 − f 22
(A.13c)
For legacy civil GPS signals where L2 does not have a pseudorange mea-
surement, divergence-free smoothing can still be applied to the L1 measurement by
setting α1 = 1 and α2 = 0. This leads to the combination
ΦρL1,DF = λ1
f 21 + f
2
2
f 21 − f 22
φL1 − λ2 2f
2
2
f 21 − f 22
φL1 (A.14a)
ρ¯L1,DF = ΦρL1,DF + LPF
(
ρL1 − ΦρL1,DF
)
(A.14b)
The notation LPF (·) indicates that the time series of measurements is low
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pass filtered according to equation A.7. When full dual frequency measurements
are available, L2 divergence-free smoothed pseudorange can be computed as
ΦρL2,DF = λ1
2f 21
f 21 − f 22
φL1 − λ2 f
2
1 + f
2
2
f 21 − f 22
φL1 (A.15a)
ρ¯L2,DF = ΦρL1,DF + LPF
(
ρL1 − ΦρL1,DF
)
(A.15b)
A common measurement pairing is the so called narrow-lane code – wide-
lane carrier combination. This pair also happens to be a divergence-free combina-
tion:
ρNL =
f1
f1 + f2
ρL1 +
f2
f1 + f2
ρL2 (A.16a)
ΦWL = λ1
f1
f1 − f2φL1 − λ2
f2
f1 − f2φL1 (A.16b)
ρ¯NL = ΦWL + LPF (ρNL − ΦWL) (A.16c)
A.1.6 Double Difference Error Model
Combining the double difference measurement model in equation (A.6b) on
page 120 with the smoothed pseudorange measurement model (A.11b), the model
for a pair of smoothed pseudorange and carrier phase measurements is:
ρ¯klij = r
kl
ij + I
kl
ij + T
kl
ij + w¯
kl
ρij
+ λ
(
wklφ,ij − w¯klφ,ij
)
(A.17a)
λφklij = r
kl
ij − Iklij + T klij + λγkl0ij + wklφij (A.17b)
γkl0ij ∈ Z (A.17c)
Using Q(·) to indicate the covariance of the error sources, treating BRSD
atmospheric residuals as bounded by a zero-mean Gaussian error for short baselines
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which are independent between satellites, and assuming noise and multipath are
independent among receivers and satellites, the covariances of double difference
pseudoranges and carrier phases can be constructed as
Qρ¯klij =
QIkij +QIlij +QTkij +QT lij +Qw¯klρij
+λ2
(
Qwklφ,ij +Qw¯klφ,ij − 2cov
(
wklφ,ij, w¯
kl
φ,ij
)) (A.18a)
λ2Qφklij = QIkij +QIlij +QTkij +QT lij +Qwklφij
(A.18b)
The variance of residual atmospheric errors can be modeled as a linear function
of between receiver separation. The variance of the smoothed multipath and noise
parameters is a function of the smoothing duration and the autocorrelation function
of the underlying multipath processes. The covariance between the current carrier
phase noise and multipath and the smoothed version of the same is
cov
(
wklφ,ij, w¯
kl
φ,ij
)
=
1
nmax
Qwklφ,ij + ετ (A.19)
where nmax is the number of samples smoothed and ετ is the effect of time correla-
tion in the carrier phase multipath, which is neglected.
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The covariance between two pseudorange double differences is
cov
(
ρ¯k1l1i1j1 , ρ¯
k2l2
i2j2
)
=
(
Q
I
k1
i1j1
+Q
T
k1
i1j1
)
(δk1k2 − δk1l2)
+
(
Q
I
l1
i1j1
+Q
T
l1
i1j1
)
(δl1l2 − δl1k2)
+
(
Q
w¯
k1
ρi1
+ λ2
(
nmax − 2
nmax
Q
w
k1
φ,i1
+Q
w¯
k1
φ,i1
))
(δk1k2 − δk1l2) δi1i2
+
(
Q
w¯
l1
ρi1
+ λ2
(
nmax − 2
nmax
Q
w
l1
φ,i1
+Q
w¯
l1
φ,i1
))
(δl1l2 − δl1k2) δi1i2
−
(
Q
w¯
k1
ρj1
+ λ2
(
nmax − 2
nmax
Q
w
k1
φ,j1
+Q
w¯
k1
φ,j1
))
(δk1k2 − δk1l2) δj1j2
−
(
Q
w¯
l1
ρj1
+ λ2
(
nmax − 2
nmax
Q
w
l1
φ,j1
+Q
w¯
l1
φ,ji1
))
(δl1l2 − δl1k2) δj1j2
(A.20)
Similarly, the covariance between two carrier phase double differences is
λ2cov
(
φk1l1i1j1 , φ
k2l2
i2j2
)
=
(
Q
I
k1
i1j1
+Q
T
k1
i1j1
)
(δk1k2 − δk1l2)
+
(
Q
I
l1
i1j1
+Q
T
l1
i1j1
)
(δl1l2 − δl1k2)
+ λ2
(
Q
w
k1
φ,i1
(δk1k2 − δk1l2) +Qwl1φ,i1 (δl1l2 − δl1k2)
)
δi1i2
− λ2
(
Q
w
k1
φ,j1
(δk1k2 − δk1l2) +Qwl1φ,j1 (δl1l2 − δl1k2)
)
δj1j2
(A.21)
Finally, the covariance between a carrier phase double differences and a
pseudorange double difference is
cov
(
λφk1l1i1j1 , ρ¯
k2l2
i2j2
)
=
(
Q
I
k1
i1j1
+Q
T
k1
i1j1
)
(δk1k2 − δk1l2)
+
(
Q
I
l1
i1j1
+Q
T
l1
i1j1
)
(δl1l2 − δl1k2)
+ λ2
nmax − 2
nmax
(
Q
w
k1
φ,i1
(δk1k2 − δk1l2) +Qwl1φ,i1 (δl1l2 − δl1k2)
)
δi1i2
− λ2nmax − 2
nmax
(
Q
w
k1
φ,j1
(δk1k2 − δk1l2) +Qwl1φ,j1 (δl1l2 − δl1k2)
)
δj1j2
(A.22)
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Appendix B
Linearized Least Squares Relative Position Solution
The purpose of a CDGNSS solution is to determine the position of a rover
receiver relative to a reference receiver. In the event that the reference receiver is at
a static, well-known position, the absolute position of the rover receiver can also be
determined with commensurate accuracy and precision. However, even in the case
that the absolute position of the reference receiver is only known to several tens of
meters, the relative position can still be extremely useful. This section develops the
linearized least-squares estimate of the relative position, or baseline, between the
receivers that neglects the integer nature of the double difference ambiguity.
B.1 Float Solution
Given the non-linear measurement and error models defined in Appendix
A, a linearized, weighted least-squares estimate of the relative position between
the two antennas. Given initial estimates of the two antenna positions, r¯i and r¯j ,
and initial estimate of their relative position, or baseline, is given as b¯ = r¯i − r¯j .
The initial position estimates may come from a survey of the reference station or
the absolute position estimate from each set of measurements. From these initial
estimates, an linearization point for the double differenced geometric range can be
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obtained. The true baseline is b = b¯+ δb.
rklij =
∥∥rk − ri∥∥− ∥∥rk − rj∥∥− ∥∥rl − ri∥∥+ ∥∥rl − rj∥∥
=
∥∥rk − (rj + b)∥∥− ∥∥rl − (rj + b)∥∥+ ∥∥rl − rj∥∥− ∥∥rk − rj∥∥
≈ rklij
∣∣
b=bˆ
+
∂
∂b
rklij · δb
(B.1)
The partial derivative of a vector norm is the unit vector in that direction, so
∂
∂b
rklij =
∂
∂b
∥∥rk − (rj + b)∥∥− ∂
∂b
∥∥rl − (rj + b)∥∥
= − r
k − ri
‖rk − ri‖ +
rl − ri
‖rl − ri‖
(B.2)
Defining the unit vector from satellite k to antenna i as
uki = −
rk − ri
‖rk − ri‖ (B.3)
The geometric range can then be linearized as
rklij ≈ rklij
∣∣
b=bˆ
+
(
uki − uli
)T · δb (B.4)
Using (B.4) in the double difference measurement equation (A.17), lumping
the error terms into a single error term for compactness, and representing the carrier
phase ambiguity as a ∈ Z:
ρ¯klij − rklij
∣∣
b=bˆ
=
(
uki − uli
)T · δb+ ερklij (B.5a)
λφklij − rklij
∣∣
b=bˆ
=
(
uki − uli
)T · δb+ λaklij + εφklij (B.5b)
For m double differences all using a common reference satellite (i.e. li =
l ∀i), the linearized measurements can be stacked in vectors. Define
yρ ,

ρ¯1lij − r1lij
∣∣
b=bˆ
...
ρ¯mlij − rmlij
∣∣
b=bˆ
 (B.6)
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yφ ,

λφ1lij − r1lij
∣∣
b=bˆ
...
λφmlij − rmlij
∣∣
b=bˆ
 (B.7)
G ,

(
u1i − uli
)T
...(
uni − uli
)T
 (B.8)
Λ ,

λ1 0
. . .
0 λm
 (B.9)
y =
[
yρ
yφ
]
=
[
G 0m×m
G Λ
][
δb
a
]
+
[
ερ
εφ
]
y = H
[
δb
a
]
+
[
ερ
εφ
] (B.10)
The float solution can be obtained by carefully constructing the double difference
measurement covariance matrix, Qy according to equations (A.20), (A.21), and
(A.22), and computing a weighted least squares solution to the preceding linearized
equations.
xˆ =
[
δbˆ
aˆ
]
=
(
HTQ−1y H
)−1
HTQ−1y y (B.11)
The errors in this correction to the initial baseline estimate and carrier phase
ambiguity vector are dominated by the smoothed pseudorange multipath in most
applications. Also, the vector aˆ is real-valued, or floating point. If the integer values
of a can be determined from the floating point values of aˆ, then the correction to
the initial baseline estimate can be further refined. This is called the fixed solution.
It will be described further in the next section.
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Appendix C
Interpretation and Properties of the Float Ambiguity
C.1 Interpretation of L and D
It will be convenient to decompose the covariance of the float ambiguity as
Qzˆ = LDL
T , where L is a unit lower triangular matrix and D is a diagonal matrix,
and to model the float ambiguity as the true ambiguity plus zero-mean Gaussian
noise, zˆ = z + ,  ∼ N(0, Qzˆ). Multiplication by L−1 transforms  into a vector
whose elements are mutually uncorrelated: c , L−1, c ∼ N(0, D). Letting lij
denote the ijth element of L, di the ith element of the diagonal of D, and i and ci
the ith elements of  and c, respectively, i and its variance can be computed from
the first i components of c as
i =
i∑
k=1
likck, var (i) =
i∑
k=1
l2ikdk (C.1)
Note that, because L and L−1 are upper triangular, vectors of the first i− 1
elements of c, cI , [c1, . . . , ci−1]T can be constructed from I with the elements
of L−1 denoted as `jk.
cj =
j∑
k=1
`jkk (C.2)
131
This fact allows us to give the equivalence
E [j |I ] = E [j |cI ]
= E
[
j∑
k=1
ljkck |cI
]
(C.3)
Since subsequent values of ck are independent of the preceding values, the condi-
tioning can be removed for k ≥ i. Also, the expectation of the given value is simply
the given value.
E [j |c1, . . . , ci−1 ] =
j∑
k=i
ljk
:0E [ck] +
i−1∑
k=1
ljkck
=
i−1∑
k=1
ljkck
(C.4)
The conditional variance is then derived by the following steps:
var (j |I ) = E
[
(j − E [j |I ])2 |I
]
(C.5a)
= E
( j∑
k=1
ljkck −
i−1∑
k=1
ljkck
)2
|I
 (C.5b)
= E
( j∑
k=i
ljkck
)2 (C.5c)
= E
[
j∑
k=i
j∑
h=i
ljkljhckch
]
(C.5d)
=
j∑
k=i
j∑
h=i
ljkljhE [ckch] (C.5e)
=
j∑
k=i
j∑
h=i
ljkljhdkδhk (C.5f)
=
j∑
k=i
l2jkdk (C.5g)
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(C.5a) by the definition of conditional variance; (C.5b) by substituting the condi-
tional mean (C.4); (C.5c) by canceling the first i − 1 terms; (C.5d) by expanding
the square into a summation; (C.5e) by the linearity of expectation; (C.5f) by the
variance of ck; (C.5g) by canceling the Kronecker delta in the summation.
As a step toward interpreting lij , define the conditional variances and co-
variances as
σ2ji|I , cov
(
j|I , i|I
)
, for j > i (C.6a)
By definition, the conditional covariance is
σ2ji|I = E [ (j − E [j |I ]) (i − E [i |I ])| I] (C.7)
Substitution of (C.1) and the means of (C.4) into (C.7) and simplification yields
σ2ji|I = E
[(
j∑
k=i
ljkck
)
(ci)
∣∣∣∣∣ I
]
=
j∑
k=i
ljkE [ckci| I]
(C.8)
Since ck and ci are independent zero-mean variables:
σ2ji|I =
j∑
k=i
ljkdiδik
= ljidi
(C.9)
The value di has already been identified as the variance of i|I , σ2i|I . Thus, lji can
be interpreted as
lji =

σ2ji|Iσ
−2
i|I j > i
1 j = i
0 j < i
(C.10)
which comports with the fact that L is a unit lower triangular matrix.
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C.2 Relationships among zˆ, zˆc, zˇ, ˇ and ˇc
Adopting the notation from Section 2.2.1, the sequentially-constrained float
ambiguity vector, zˆc, is defined such that its ith element is zˇci = zˇi|I . Each zˇci is
computed as
zˆci =
{
zˆi i = 1
zˆi −
∑i−1
k=1 lik(zˆck − zˇk) i ∈ {2, . . . ,m}
(C.11)
where lik is the i, k entry in the matrix L. Because L is unit lower triangular, (C.11)
can be expressed in vector form as
zˆc = zˆ − (L− I) (zˆc − zˇ) (C.12)
Rearranging and collecting terms in L yields
zˆ − zˇ = L (zˆc − zˇ) (C.13)
By definition, ˇ = zˆ − zˇ, so
ˇ = L (zˆc − zˇ) (C.14)
Multiplication by L−1 produces
L−1ˇ = zˆc − zˇ (C.15)
Also by definition, ˇc = L−1ˇ, which produces the result:
ˇc = zˆc − zˇ (C.16)
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Appendix D
Derivations for Data-Driven PDI
D.1 Truncation of Posterior Risk Probabilities
D.1.1 Posterior PDI and Fixing Probabilities
Consider a set of alternative fix candidates that includes the IB ambiguity
estimate Z = {zˇ −∆z |∆z ∈ {0, ζ1, . . . , ζν}}. Denote the IB solution in this set
as zˇ0 , zˇ. Denote any other element of this set as zˇk , zˇ0 − ζk, with k ∈
{1, . . . , ν}. The sequentially-constrained ambiguity residual under the hypothesis
that zˇk = z is defined, in agreement with (3.44), as
ˇkc = ˇc + L
−1
1:r,1:rζk
= ˇc + L
−1
1:r,1:r
(
zˇ0 − zˇk) (D.1)
The final expression of (D.1) can be recognized as the argument of the
norms in (3.45). Define the likelihood functions
λk , exp(−1
2
∥∥ˇkc∥∥2D1:r,1:r) = r∏
j=1
exp
(
−(ˇ
k
cj)
2
2dj
)
(D.2)
Using the λk notation, the posterior fixing probabilities are
P (Eζk |ε, i) =
λk∑∞
j=0 λj
(D.3)
and the posterior PDI risk is bounded by
R = 1−
s∑
k=0
(1−Rk) λk∑∞
j=0 λj
(D.4)
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To obtain an upper bound on the risk, a lower bound is needed on (D.3).
Break the set of all alternative fixes into sets Z and Zc, indexed by j ∈ {0, . . . , ν}
and j ∈ {ν + 1, . . . ,∞}, respectively.
P (Eζk |ε, i) =
λk∑ν
j=0 λj +
∑∞
j=ν+1 λj
(D.5)
Define λ∞ ,
∑∞
j=ν+1 λj . For any λ
∗ ∈ {λ|λ∞ ≤ λ}, an upper bound on the
neglected fixes not considered, a lower bound on (D.3) is
λk∑ν
j=0 λj + λ
∗ ≤ P (Eζk |ε, i) (D.6)
To ensure integrity for safety-of-life applications, a value of λ∗ must be
found that provably bounds λ∞. To reduce computational complexity, it is desirable
to reduce the size of the set of alternatives considered by minimizing ν.
D.1.2 Bounding Posterior Fixing Probabilities for GIAB
When the GIAB aperture is set appropriately as in [11] with sufficiently
high probability of success, and when the preceding ambiguity fixes are correct, the
probability that next fix has error ∆z /∈ {0,−sgn()} is less than PEi . This implies
that for the first ambiguity, zˇ1, there are two alternative fixes to consider. For each
of these alternatives, there are two alternatives for zˇ2, and so forth, yielding a total
of ν = 2r − 1 non-negligible alternatives to the IB solution.
The probability associated with the neglected alternative fixes can be given
an additional allocation, pneg, from an overall integrity risk budget. The neglected
fixes have posterior probability that must be bounded above by the allocation to
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assure safety
p∞ =
λ∞∑2r−1
j=0 λj + λ∞
≤ PF (D.7)
Isolating λ∞ yields the bound:
λ∞ ≤ PF
1− PF
2r−1∑
j=0
λj (D.8)
Though this bound is rigorous, its best-case computational complexity is
exponential in m, so it is desirable to further reduce the number of alternative fixes
that must be considered. If an additional allocation from the overall integrity risk
budget is set aside to account for further neglected alternative fixes, ν can be re-
duced.
Separate the summation in the numerator of (D.5) now into three parts:
λZ ,
∑ν
j=0 λj , λneg ,
∑2r−1
j=ν+1 λj , and λ∞ ,
∑∞
j=2r λj . If an allocation of Pneg
is made for the additionally neglected fixes, then λneg must satisfy
λneg
λZ + λneg + λ∞
≤ Pneg (D.9)
Isolating λneg as in (D.8) yields
λneg ≤ Pneg
1− Pneg (λZ + λ∞) (D.10)
Substituting (D.8) with
∑2r−1
j=0 λj = λZ + λneg and further isolating λneg
yields
λneg ≤ Pneg
1− Pneg
(
λZ +
PF
1− PF (λZ + λneg)
)
≤ Pneg
(1− Pneg)(1− PF ) (λZ + PFλneg)
≤ Pneg
1− Pneg − PF λZ
(D.11)
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which establishes the required bound on the total likelihood of the finite set of
neglected alternative fixes not inherently precluded by the GIAB aperture. The
final bound on P (Eζk |ε, i) can be obtained after some tedious algebra, assuming
(D.8) and (D.11) hold
(1− Pneg − PF )λk
λZ
≤ P (Eζk |ε, i) (D.12)
D.1.3 Binary-Tree-Based Alternative Fix Pruning
The set of all 2r fixes not excluded by the GIAB aperture can be represented
by the leaves of a binary tree of depth r. Each node represents a decision point
in the IB process. The left-child of a node at depth i corresponds to the nearest
integer to zˆc(i+1) when conditioned on the previous assumed fixes. The right-child
corresponds to the next-nearest integer.
For example, in Fig. D.1, node 4 corresponds to the IB solution zˇleft1 = bzˆ1e
and ˇleftc1 = zˆ1 − zˇleft1 , while node 12 corresponds to zˇright1 = zˇleft1 + sgn
(
ˇleftc1
)
and
ˇrightc1 = ˇ
left
c1 − sgn(ˇleftc1 ). Each descendant of node 12 constrains the subsequent
ambiguities assuming z1 = zˇ
right
1 . Similarly, node 1 corresponds to the GIAB solu-
tion, zˇ0 = zˇ, and node 3 corresponds to zˇ1 = zˇ + [0, . . . , 0, sgn(ˇcr)]T.
To save computational effort, the binary tree can be constructed recursively
while keeping a running total of the considered and neglected likelihoods. Define
the partial likelihood function by truncating the products in (D.2)
λkh ,
h∏
j=1
exp
(
−(ˇ
k
cj)
2
2dj
)
(D.13)
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0i 
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Figure D.1: The set of non-negligible fix candidates can be represented as a binary
tree of depth r, shown for r = 3. See the body text for a full interpretation of
the tree. The nodes are numbered according to the order visited by an in-order
traversal. Unshaded leaf-nodes correspond to alternative IB solutions. Non-leaf
nodes, which are all shaded, partial IB solutions leading to the different alternatives.
The shade of lines matches the shade of the nearest ancestor node that generated the
corresponding IB solution leaf, e.g. node 4 and leaf-node 5. Dashed lines indicate
neglected branches of the tree.
139
Note that for h > 1,
λkh = exp
(
−(ˇ
k
cj)
2
2dh
)
λkh−1 ≤ λkh−1 (D.14)
Also, the likelihood of an alternative fix is λkr = λk as defined in (D.2). The λ
k
h are
stored in a vector λk.
Nodes in the binary tree at depth i store a 4-tuple,
(
i, zˇki , ˇ
k
ci, λ
k
i
)
. Note that
any descendants of a node at depth i have the first i elements of their candidate
fixes in common, i.e. zˇk(1:i) = zˇ
j
(1:i) when both zˇ
k and zˇj correspond to leaves of a
common ancestor node at depth i.
The root of the tree is indicated by its value (0, ∅, ∅, 1), where ∅ indicates
a null value. The tree is initialized from the IB solution by setting each left-child
from the root at depth i to (i, zˇ0i , ˇ
0
ci, λ
0
i ). This is the left-most branch of the trees in
Fig. D.2. Initialization is captured in Algorithm D.2.
Algorithm D.1: buildBranch(&parent, zˇk, ˇkc ,λk, i)
Input : parent ∈ BinaryTree〈(Z,Z,R,R)〉, zˇk ∈ Zr, ˇkc ∈ Rr,
λk ∈ Rr, i ∈ {1, . . . , r}
1 node = BinaryTree
(
(i, zˇki , ˇ
k
ci, λ
k
i )
)
2 node.parent = parent
3 if (i 6= length(zˇk) then
4 buildBranch(node, zˇk, ˇkc ,λ
k, i+ 1)
5 end
6 if parent 6= NULL then
7 parent.left = node
8 end
The tree is constructed via an in-order tree traversal, illustrated in Fig. D.2,
during which every node is visited after its left-children but before its right-children.
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1i 
2i 
3i 
Depth
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0ζ 2ζ
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Figure D.2: Illustration of part of the process of building the binary tree of alternate
fixes via an in-order tree traversal. The tree is initialized with the IB solution as
the left-children of the root-node. The first node visited is the leaf corresponding
to the IB solution. The second node visited, labeled 2, produces the first alternative
solution, with offset ζ1, which is stored as the right-child of node 2, and visited next.
Node 4 is visited next, which leads to the second alternative solution, with offset
ζ2. This alternative fix is stored in the branch with nodes labeled 6 and 5. Node 5 is
visited next and added to Z and λZ. The alternative branches at nodes 6 and 7 are
then found to be negligible, completing the tree traversal and construction.
Algorithm D.2: initIBTree(zˇ, ˇc,λ)
Input : zˇ ∈ Zr, ˇc ∈ Rr, λ ∈ Rr
Output: root ∈ BinaryTree〈(Z,Z,R,R)〉
1 root = BinaryTree((0, ∅, ∅, 1))
2 buildBranch(root, zˇ, ˇc,λ, 1)
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Algorithm D.3: altIB(zˇ, ˇc,λ, L−1,d, i)
Input : zˇ ∈ Zr, ˇc ∈ Rr, λ ∈ Rr, L−1 ∈ Rm×m, d ∈ Rm,
i ∈ {1, . . . , r}
Output: zˇalt ∈ Zr, ˇaltc ∈ Rr, λalt ∈ Rr
1 r = length(ˇc)
2 zˇalt = zˇ
3 zˇalti += sgn (ˇci)
4 ˇaltc = ˇc + L
−1
1:r,i
(
zˇi − zˇalti
)
5 λalt = λ
6 if i == 1 then
7 λalti = exp(− ˇ
2
ci
2di
)
8 else
9 λalti = λ
alt
i−1 exp(− ˇ
2
ci
2di
)
10 end
11 for j = i+ 1:r do
12 zˇaltj += bˇaltcj e
13 ˇaltc = ˇ
alt
c + L
−1
1:r,j
(
zˇj − zˇaltj
)
14 λaltj = λ
alt
j−1 exp(−
ˇ2cj
2dj
)
15 end
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Algorithm D.4: getSolution(&node)
Input : node ∈ BinaryTree〈(Z,Z,R,R)〉
Output: zˇ ∈ Zr, ˇc ∈ Rr, λ ∈ Rr
1 temp = node
2 while temp.left 6= NULL do
3 temp = temp.left
4 end
5 zˇ = zeros(temp.data(1),1)
6 ˇc = zeros(temp.data(1),1)
7 λ = zeros(temp.data(1),1)
8 while temp.parent 6= NULL do
9 i = temp.data(1)
10 zˇi = temp.data(2)
11 ˇci = temp.data(3)
12 λi = temp.data(4)
13 temp = temp.parent
14 end
Each node is processed according to Algorithm D.5 when visited. When a node is
visited, its corresponding solution is obtained via Algorithm D.4. If the node is a
leaf (i.e. its left-child is NULL), then its likelihood is included in the running total
of λZ. The fix and its likelihood are stored in a list of considered fixes, sorted by λj .
If the node is not a leaf, then an alternative solution must be considered.
The partial likelihood of the right-child node, λrighti+1 , is computed assuming that
zˇrighti+1 = zˇ
left
i+1 + sgn(ˇ
left
ci ) and that ˇ
right
c(i+1) = ˇ
left
c(i+1) − sgn(ˇleftc(i+1)) according to (D.1).
The right-child node at depth i+1 will have at most 2r−(i+1) descendant leaves, each
with a likelihood less than or equal to λrighti+1 ; e.g. in Fig. D.1, node 12 at depth 1
has 23−1 = 4 leaves in its branch. Thus the total likelihood of the right-branch is
bounded above as λbranch ≤ 2r−(i+1)λrighti+1 . Given a running total the considered and
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Algorithm D.5: visitNode(&node, &λZ, &λneg, &fixes, Pneg, L−1,d)
Input : node ∈ BinaryTree〈(Z,Z,R,R)〉, λZ ∈ R, λneg ∈ R, fixes ∈
SortedList, Pneg ∈ R, L−1 ∈ Rm×m, d ∈ Rm
1
[
zˇleft, ˇleftc ,λ
left
]
= getSolution(node)
2 i = node.data(1)
3 r = length(zˇleft)
4 if node.left == NULL then
5 λZ += λ
left
i
6 fixes.insert
({
λlefti , zˇ
left
})
7 else
8 λtemp = λ
left
i exp(−(
1−|ˇleftc(i+1)|)2
2di+1
)
9 if 2r−(i+1)λtemp ≤ PnegλZ − λneg then
10 [zˇright, ˇrightc ,λ
right] = altIB(zˇleft, ˇleftc ,λ
left, L−1,d, i+ 1)
11 buildBranch(node, zˇright, ˇrightc ,λ
right, i+ 1)
12 else
13 λneg += 2
r−(i+1)λtemp
14 end
15 end
144
neglected likelihoods, λZ and λneg respectively, a branch can be neglected if
λneg + 2
r−(i+1)λrighti+1 <
pneg
1− pnegλZ (D.15)
λneg is then updated as λneg = λneg + 2r−(i+1)λ
right
i+1 .
If (D.15) does not hold, then the branch cannot be assumed negligible,
so an alternative IB solution is computed with Algorithm D.3 by assuming that
zi+1 = zˇ
left
i+1 + sgn(ˇ
left
c(i+1)). Given this assumption, the subsequent ambiguities are
constrained and IB is performed on them. This alternative solution is then stored
as the right-child by Algorithm D.1. E.g. when node 4 is visited, the likelihood of
node 6 is non-negligible, so the IB solution terminating at node 5 is computed and
added to the tree. The tree traversal then continues around the modified tree.
Using this traversal-construction method, a list of all non-negligible alterna-
tive fix candidates can be constructed without evaluating any of the neglected alter-
natives explicitly. The list is then used to compute the probabilities (D.12), which
are in turn needed to compute (3.48). The summation in (3.48) can be truncated
as soon as RGIAB is less than a specified bound, reducing the number of required
computations of Rk, which requires the computationally expensive Gaussian CDF.
D.2 Distribution of Truncated Gaussian
Consider a known conditional distribution fX|A (x) of a random vectorX ∈
Rn given some event A. Also consider event B : {X ∈ B ⊂ Rn}. Define the
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indicator function for the region B as
1B(x) ,
{
1 x ∈ B
0 otherwise
(D.16)
The distribution of X when further conditioned on event B can be expressed via
the definition of a multivariate PDF.
fX|A,B (x) =
∂n
∂x1 . . . ∂xn
FX|A,B (x) (D.17)
The conditional cumulative density function (CDF) can be determined by condi-
tional probability as
FX|A,B (x) =
P (X ≤ x, B|A)
P (B|A) (D.18)
Multiplication of fX|A (ξ) by the indicator function produces the joint PDF which
must be integrated to compute the numerator and denominator above:
P (X = ξ, B|A) = fX|A (ξ) 1B(ξ) (D.19)
The numerator is computed as the integral over the regionX ≤ xwhile the denom-
inator is the integral over the region B. In B, the in indicator function is identically
equal to 1, and so is elided.
FX|A,B (x) =
∫ x
−∞ fX|A (ξ) 1B(ξ)dξ∫
B
fX|A (ζ) dζ
(D.20)
Substituting (D.20) into (D.17) and application of the second fundamental theorem
of calculus yields:
fX|A,B (x) =
∂n
∂x1 . . . ∂xn
∫ x
−∞ fX|A (ξ) 1B(ξ)dξ∫
B
fX|A (ζ) dζ
=
fX|A (x) 1B(x)∫
B
fX|A (ζ) dζ
(D.21)
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Appendix E
Proof of Correlation Agnostic Bound
To prove the result in (4.15), begin with the expression
RMLV ≤ 1−
∫ AL
−AL
∫ AL
−AL
fj ,k (ξ, ζ) dζdξ (E.1)
Next, use conditional probability to separate the joint distribution into the product
of a marginal and a conditional distribution. Bring the marginal distribution out of
the inner integral.
RMLV ≤ 1−
∫ AL
−AL
fj (ξ)
∫ AL
−AL
fk|j (ζ|j = ξ) dζdξ (E.2)
The law of total probability shows that∫ AL
−AL
fk|j (ζ|j = ξ) dζ = 1− P (|k| > AL|j = ξ) (E.3)
Substituting (E.3) into (E.2), distributing fj (ξ), and separating the two parts of the
integral yields
RMLV ≤1−
∫ AL
−AL
fj (ξ) dξ +
∫ AL
−AL
fj (ξ) · P (|k|| > AL|j = ξ) dξ (E.4)
Defining Rj , P (|j| ≥ AL) = 1−
∫ AL
−AL fj (ξ) dξ, simplify
RMLV ≤ Rj +
∫ AL
−AL
fj (ξ)P (|k|| > AL|j = ξ) dξ (E.5)
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Expand P (|k|| > AL|j = ξ) into integrals over (−∞,−AL] and [AL,∞):
RMLV ≤ Rj +
∫ AL
−AL
fj (ξ) ·

∫ −AL
−∞
fk|j (ζ|j = ξ)dζ
+
∫ ∞
AL
fk|j (ζ|j = ξ) dζ

 dξ (E.6)
Multiply the conditional and marginal PDFs to form the joint PDF and reverse the
order of integration.
RMLV ≤ Rj +
∫ −AL
−∞
∫ AL
−AL
fj ,k (ξ, ζ) dξdζ +
∫ ∞
AL
∫ AL
−AL
fj ,k (ξ, ζ) dξdζ (E.7)
Because PDFs are non-negative, expanding the limits of the inner integral yields
another upper bound.
RMLV ≤ Rj +
∫ −AL
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
fj ,k (ξ, ζ) dξdζ +
∫ ∞
AL
∫ ∞
−∞
fj ,k (ξ, ζ) dξdζ (E.8)
The inner integrals marginalize out j .
RMLV ≤ Rj +
∫ −AL
−∞
fk (ζ)dζ +
∫ ∞
AL
fk (ζ)dζ (E.9)
The sum of the integrals may be recognized as the probability that the kth solution
error exceeds the AL.
RMLV ≤ Rj +Rk (E.10)
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